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Key Terms
I have taken great effort to both include and exclude various terms within my
thesis in order to avoid words that I believe to be highly politicized or have unjustly
gained a negative connotation when used in the context of the Middle East. Below I have
defined each of these commonly found terms in hopes of providing my readers with
clarity as well as explaining my own decision to include or exclude certain words in my
study.
Islamic State (IS): The name of the organization now known as the Islamic State has
undergone several changes over the years. In November 2006, the leader of AQI declared
the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). After setbacks, resurgence, and an expansion into Syria,
the ISI became the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in April 2013. This title
lasted for approximately a year until the Islamic State (IS) was declared in June 2014.1
While the Islamic State is a movement for the creation of an Islamic Caliphate outside the
normal nation-state system, I refer to it by this name because of the organization’s
preference to be addressed by this name.
Terrorism/terrorist: Like Jonathan Matusitz, I believe that terrorism is a pejorative term.
People employ the term in order to “characterize their enemies’ actions as something evil
and lacking human compassion.”2 I refrain from using this term to describe the attacks of
the female combatants whose stories I analyze as I wish to let their actions and
circumstances speak for themselves.

1

al-‘Ubaydi et al., “The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and
Challenges of the Islamic State.”
2
Jonathan Andre Matusitz, Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2013).
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Female combatant/resistor: I use the term combatant interchangeably with resistor in
order to move away from the negative connotation that is sometimes connected to the
word attacker. I am writing with the understanding that the women within my thesis are
equal participants in their respective resistant movements and deserve to be addressed as
such.
Jihad: Jihad is considered the obligation of Muslims around the world and literally means
to struggle. Its meaning varies on context ranging from an inner spiritual struggle to a
more physical struggle or resistance against domination in political situations that are
perceived to be a threat to Muslims.3
Islamism/Islamist: Islamism is a political form of Islam and an Islamist is “an advocate or
supporter of a political movement that favors reordering government and society in
accordance with laws prescribed by Islam. Do not use as a synonym for Islamic fighters,
militants, extremists or radicals, who may or may not be Islamists.”4 I would like to note
that Islam and Islamists cannot and should not be used interchangeably.

3

Magdalena Martinez Magdalena Martinez, “Women in Jihad: A Question of Honour,
Pride and Self-Defence,” World Journal of Islamic in History and Civilization 1, no. 1
(2011): 27–36.
4
Abby Ohlheiser and Leon Neyfakh, “The Associated Press’s New Definition of
‘Islamist,’” Slate, April 5, 2013,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/04/05/_islamist_definition_changed_in_the_
ap_stylebook_two_days_after_illegal.html.

Koranteng 5
Introduction
For generations, the women of the Middle East have contributed to various
resistance and state-building movements during times of war and protracted conflict
within the region. The general public’s interests in the Middle East has become
reinvigorated due to the US and UK closely following the growing conflicts within the
region after 9/11 and the subsequent increase in foreign political and military
interventions within the region. As the forms of mass communications continue to
evolve, we consume increasingly large amounts of media on the war, conflict, and
instability of the Middle East with women in the region—particularly those who openly
partake in and approve of armed struggle as a means of resistance. While the media, like
its audience, is seemingly appalled by the idea that women are sent to kill themselves or
choose to do so, they remain captivated by female suicide bombing in particular as “it
constitutes a distinct expression of female militancy, in that females transgress gender
norms, not only by taking life, but also by embracing their own death, and in the process,
counter existing core symbolic structures delimiting gender while at the same time
creating new ones.”5 Headlines of captivating stories of “female terrorists” have
continued to grow in popularity, with many media sources attempting to understand this
seemingly new phenomena.
Unfortunately, US and UK media have failed greatly in providing their general
public with thoughtful and well analyzed stories that help increase understanding of the
complexity of women’s experiences within times of war and conflict. Instead, one can

5

Cindy D. Ness, “In the Name of the Cause: Women’s Work in Secular and Religious
Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 5 (September 1, 2005): 353–73,
doi:10.1080/10576100500180337.
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find numerous examples stories, articles, and books filled with overly simplistic
narratives of women’s roles in armed struggle within the Middle East, often based in their
own prejudices, conceptions of womanhood, and orientalist tendencies. In my analysis, I
have found that US and UK reporting is highly episodic, often failing to situate these
women’s experiences and actions within the larger contexts of war and conflict that they
operate within, instead choosing to focus more on aspects of their lives that make them
‘more feminine’—their romantic relationships, physical descriptions, and reproductive
ability. Their acts of armed political struggle are dismissed as being weak, naïve, and
brainwashed into committing baseless and unnecessarily violent acts of revenge. Little
effort is made to hear their stories, to understand their experiences and their truths. This is
the way that our media wants us to understand female militancy in the Middle East—as
illegitimate and unsubstantiated.
When a group of young Palestinian women were arrested and in some cases killed
for stabbing or attempting to stab Israeli Defense soldiers and Israeli settlers in an
uprising beginning in October of 2015, US media sources were captivated by the fact that
young females were participating in violent acts declaring that “for perhaps the first time
in the patriarchal Palestinian society they are acting on their own, without consulting any
male authorities.”6 We were told the stories of young women such as sixteen-year-old
Ashrakat Qattanani, who “swapped her schoolbooks for a knife” on November 22nd, 2015
when she charged at a young Israeli woman waiting at a bus stop near a military

6

Diaa Hadid and Rami Nazzal, “Young Palestinian Women Join the West Bank
Turmoil,” The New York Times, December 1, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/world/middleeast/young-palestinian-women-adoptunfamiliar-role-in-seeking-to-become-killers.html.
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checkpoint.7 Ashrakat is reported to have told her father “don’t cry for me, cry for
Palestine” prior to her attack, yet it is treated as a fleeting statement by a “rebellious soul”
not the words of a young girl whose short life was lived under military occupation.8
Around the same time as Ashrakat’s attack, other articles told the stories of other young
women such as cousins Hadeel and Nourhan Awwad and a 19-year-old university
student, Maram Hasouna who all died after attempting stabbing attacks. Through these
articles we explore the rise of Palestinian women within their “new” combative roles
“confounding families and a society unaccustomed to women who want to be killers”, but
not without learning about their engagements, broken homes, and conservative families
who don’t let their daughters wear make-up.9 Not only are these women more feminine
characteristics emphasized, but they are written off as killers and murderers, their acts
framed as malicious and their political nature diminished.
As the examples above show, in doing a close reading of media focusing on
female combatants in the Middle East we see how the US and UK media create narratives
through their framing and representation of regional conflicts and the actors within
them—they choose who is represented as good and who is evil, but is it really that
simple? Do all young women living within the West Bank and Jerusalem become
attackers merely because they are sad or come from “broken” homes? This pattern in
incomplete and biased reporting has pushed me to look for answers. How do US and UK
media representations of women’s roles, experiences, and motives for partaking in armed
7

Hadid and Nazzal, “Young Palestinian Women Join the West Bank Turmoil.”
“Quiet in Past Uprisings, Palestinian Women Have Asserted the Roles of Martyrs in
Israeli Stabbing Attacks,” National Post, accessed March 22, 2016,
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/quiet-in-past-uprisingspalestinian-women-have-asserted-the-roles-of-martyrs-in-israeli-stabbing-attacks.
9
Hadid and Nazzal, “Young Palestinian Women Join the West Bank Turmoil.”
8
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struggle impact the ways in which we understand gender and contemporary within the
region? What types of prejudices have led to this trend of delegitimizing and ignoring
more women’s militant roles in political resistance in the Middle East? How can we
better understand these women’s experiences and lived realities? I seek to answer these
questions throughout my research in an attempt to contribute to current academic texts
analyzing women in within contexts of conflict and resistance movements within the
Middle East.
In this thesis, I use the case studies of Palestine and the so called Islamic State as
examples of two similar, yet unique examples of resistance movements framed within the
larger context of war and conflict that has come to especially characterize the Levant. I
explore US and UK media’s framing and representations of these women’s actions and
roles within conflict in order to better understand how media and mass communications
control and manipulate their audiences’ understanding of women and conflict within the
Middle East. I argue that the US and UK media’s representations of Middle East women
in conflict neglect to capture the complex nature of their lived realities and the many
ways that conflict and war affect their existence. I believe that it is important to
investigate these deficiencies in media reporting as we cannot truly understand these
women’s experiences until we first understand the biases in our media’s reporting and
representations of these women.
Literature Review
Media Framing

Our lives are saturated with news provided to us through mass-mediated
communication—it’s in our homes, on our phones, and in our classrooms subtly planting
various ideas. Its power is in escapable; “Media discourses play a central role in In Media
and Society: The Production of Culture in the Mass Media, Ryan and Wentworth suggest
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that mass-mediated communication is a powerful socialization agent that transmits
cultural rules and beliefs through its messages, images, and representations of various
peoples, actions, and activities.10 These messages “reproduce[e] the collective belief
system of the dominant culture and the core values of society (Henry & Tarot, 2002)”11
and allow the media to “effect change and stability in the behavior, thoughts, and
feelings of individuals” who consume it.12 Culture, when defined as “shared knowledge
and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and
responding to the social realities around them”,13 is one of the most important aspects of
this communication process as it molds the values and ways of thinking of a particular
social group attempting to craft a certain message.14 Media theorist Denis McQuail
describes mass media’s continued infiltration into all aspects of our lives and their power
to create realities and construct stories as being heavily impacted by “the political, social,
economic, and cultural situation of a society.”15 As a medium, the mass media is in no
way neutral “with its technological biases and imperatives;” it is with this knowledge of
mass media’s susceptibility to manipulation that we must be critical of the representations

10

John Ryan and William M. Wentworth, Media and Society: The Production of Culture
in the Mass Media (Boston, Mass: Allyn and Bacon, 1999).
11
Diane Watt, “Challenging Islamophobia Through Visual Media Studies: Inquiring Into
a Photograph of Muslim Women on the Cover of Canada’s National News Magazine,”
Simile 8, no. 2 (May 2008): 1–14, doi:10.3138/sim.8.2.001.
12
Ryan and Wentworth, Media and Society.
13
John Paul. Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures,
Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution; Syracuse Studies on Peace and
Conflict Resolution. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995).
14
Entman, “Framing.” 51
15
McQuail, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (London; Sage Publications,
1983), http://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9780803997714.pdf.
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it presents and critique the injustices and prejudice that often make its way into the
narratives that mass media reproduces.
Inspecting media frames provides a lens for understanding how and why media
rationalizes events and organizes reports. If we apply media theorist Robert M. Entman’s
definition of media framing, we see that it is a news source’s specific selection of some
aspects of a perceived reality in order to make these aspects more prominent as a means
of promoting a particular definition of the problem, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the event being reported. One of the
ways that framing’s capacity to promote a particular understanding or opinion of an act or
issue is through cultural resonance and magnitude. Culturally resonant relates to the use
of “words and images highly salient in the culture, which is to say noticeable,
understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged” and are believed to “ have the
greatest potential for influence.”16 Magnitude relates to “the prominence and repetition of
the framing words and images.”17 In this understanding of the capacity of framing,
Entman concludes that the more resonance and magnitude that exists within framing, the
more likely it is to arouse similar thoughts and feelings in large portions of the audience.
Arguments can be made on whether mass-media has been an agent of largely positive or
negative change, but its power is undeniable and can be reflected in the media’s current
treatment of women in conflict and war. Without acknowledging the active framing that
takes place in the reporting of news events particularly in the Middle East, we fail to
acknowledge the power of these “texts” and forget the fact that there are competing and

16

Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After
9/11,” Political Communication 20, no. 4 (2003): 415–32.
17
Entman, “Cascading Activation.”

Koranteng 11
differing discourses and interests as work when a foreign observer attempts report on
topics such as war and conflict.18
I focus on US and UK media sources throughout my thesis as they have become
two of the most widely read English language news sources today.19 These news sources
have reported extensively on global conflicts and have been at the vanguard at reporting
stories focusing on women’s militancy in the Middle East. Analysis of US and UK media
sources is also particularly interesting as the governments of both of these countries have
a shared history of political and military intervention within the Middle East. While there
is diversity in the reporting styles and goals of the many media sources and agencies that
comprise the US and UK media, I am operating under the understanding that there are
general trends and common biases that can be found within the majority of these medias.
I believe that critical readings of US and UK media sources will provide, “real-world
insights into how inclusions and exclusions are structured in public discourse, and how
this impacts everyday social relations” while exposing the various cultural constructs and
stereotypes related to Islam, women, conflict, and the Middle East that have become
pervasive in our societies.20
Reporting in Times of War & Cascading Activation Theory

Throughout world history, the media have played a large role in shaping our
knowledge and understanding of war and conflict beginning with their basic coverage of
important battles and rises in conflict.21 Media coverage in times of war has also been

18

Entman, “Cascading Activation.”
Michael Barthel, “Newspapers: Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center’s Journalism
Project, April 29, 2015, http://www.journalism.org/2015/04/29/newspapers-fact-sheet/.
20
Watt, “Challenging Islamophobia Through Visual Media Studies.”
21
Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman, War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7
(SAGE Publications Inc. (US), 2003).
19
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seen to cause great changes in public opinion of the actions of major actors. Among the
times that this ability to influence public opinion was seen in the 20th century was during
World War I and World War II. Governments on all sides directed their media to frame
coverage of the war in particular ways that would unite their populations.22 After
realizing media’s impact on society, governments made media a new tool of warfare.
During the Cold War, the US military would play music and news casts from ‘across the
curtain’ as a means of propaganda.23 Media coverage of the Vietnam war largely
impacted public opinion of US military action, with reporting contributing to a change of
tide and increase in protesting against our military policies. Media continue to play a
significant role in our post 9/11 context as the war of opinions ensues with biased US and
UK media reports on conflict in the Middle East.
In his cascading activation model, Entman uses the case study of US media’s
framing of the events following 9/11 as a means of analyzing the ways in which
government officials and journalists exercise political influence over each other as well as
the public.24 This form of framing uses unique words and images that “can be
distinguished from the rest of the news by their capacity to stimulate support of or
opposition to the sides in a political conflict.”25 It is highly effective in its ability to
“fram[e] events, issues, and actors in ways that promote perceptions and interpretations
that benefit one side while hindering the other.”26 In the case of this thesis, this type of

22

Ryan and Wentworth, Media and Society.
“Voice of America Begins Broadcasts to Russia - Feb 17, 1947,” HISTORY.com,
accessed March 9, 2016, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/voice-of-americabegins-broadcasts-to-russia.
24
Entman, “Cascading Activation.”
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
23
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framing has allowed the US and UK governments to both vilify and victimize Middle
Eastern women who live within contexts of war and conflict in order to support their
foreign policy within the region. As my media analysis will later show, orientalism and
sexism are pervasive within US and UK media framing of female combatants in the
Middle East.
Orientalism & Matrix of Domination

Orientalism written by the Palestinian-American scholar Edward Said in 1978 is
widely considered the foremost text on the post-colonial theory of Orientalism.27 In his
study, Said moves beyond defining orientalism as the study of Near and Far Eastern
societies and cultures, languages, and peoples by Western scholars and suggests that it
includes the imitation or depiction of aspects of Eastern cultures in the West by writers,
designers and artists—all of this in an effort to define the “modern” west by portraying
the Orient and Orientals as “the other”.28 Said goes on to look at the West’s various
encounters with the Near East, focusing particularly on the impact of history of Western
colonialism and imperialism within the region, and how that has impacted the way that
Orientals are represented and perceived in the US and UK.
The Orient is not just a geographical space, but a system of representations in
itself heavily framed by political forces of colonialism and imperialism that has brought
the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and Western empires. The West
uses the Orient to define itself, and constructs the Orient in opposition of its own
learning, consciousness and empire, labelling it inferior and inherently different. The

27

Irfan Habib, “In Defence of Orientalism: Critical Notes on Edward Said,” Social
Scientist 33, no. 1/2 (January 1, 2005): 40–46.
28
Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1st Vintage books ed. (New York: Vintage Books,
1979): 3-4.
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Orient’s men are characterized as weak-minded and despotic, while its women are
overtly sexualized and eroticized and perceived as relevant only for their physical
features. In this vein, orientalist knowledge production is just another expression of
Western domination, giving it the ability to restructure and have authority over discourse
on the Orient and its position in global history.29
In his explanation of the impact of Orientalism, Said also touches on the
representation of the Orient and Orientals in Western visual media and written texts. He
points out that the West has taken it upon itself to represent the Orient and its people and
cultures because it operates under the belief that the oriental people cannot depict
themselves. He goes on to problematize such actions saying, “My whole point about this
system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence — in which I do not
for a moment believe — but that it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose,
according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting.30
In addition to Said’s insightful critique of Western orientalism, when considering female
militancy in the Middle East we must understand their experiences fit into interlocking
systems of patriarchy and oppression.
In Black feminist, Patricia Hill Collins’ “Learning from the Outsider Within: The
Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought”, she explains how the various
intersections of social inequality relate to the many differences amongst people that cause
oppression of marginalized groups, which she captures through the phrase matrix of

29

Said, Orientalism, 3.
Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological
Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1986), S18
31
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domination. 31 Collins notes that Marginalized groups often gain a status of being an
"other" and points out that Brittan and Maynard claim "domination always involves the
objectification of the dominated; all forms of oppression imply the devaluation of the
subjectivity of the oppressed.” 32 This same matrix of domination and its subsequent
construction of “dichotomous oppositional difference”, which focus on differences rather
than similarities can be reflected in the West’s colonialist and imperialist interactions
with the Orient.
I find joint use of critiques of orientalism and the feminist concept of matrix of
domination to be critical tools in my study of US and UK media’s framing of female
militancy in the Middle East as they highlight the multiple systems of dominance and
oppression which characterize these media’s relationship to the peoples and issues within
the Orient. With this in mind, I argue that the US’ and UK’s historical misrepresentation
and their continued biased framing of news events and activities, particularly involving
Middle Eastern women to their role within this great matrix of domination.
Orientalized bodies and Arab Womanhood in the Media

The portrayal of “Arab womanhood” in the Western imagination is by no means a
new phenomenon, and the increased representation of these bodies in current US and UK
media is merely a resurgence based in recent events connecting the “West” to the Middle
East, including 9/11, the so-called Arab Spring, and ongoing conflict within the region.33
Technology has enabled the rapid spread of stereotypical images of “women of cover”
and however else the media choose to portray “oppressed Muslim women”, through
31

Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological
Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1986), S18
32
Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within”, S20.
33
Amira Jarmakani, Imagining Arab Womanhood: The Cultural Mythology of Veils,
Harems, and Belly Dancers in the U.S. 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2.
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blogs, online newspapers, and social media.34 At the same time we see newer images of
women taking part in protests, such as the “girl in the blue bra”35 in Egypt, Iranian
women protesting in 2009’s Green movement, and Palestinian women protesting against
the Israeli occupation. In recent decades, US and UK news sources have sent us many
messages of what it means to be a Muslim woman in the Arab world—are they oppressed
wives, daughters, or bitter widows? Are they the naïve mothers of terrorists or are they
the “terrorists” themselves? As we go through a process of deconstructing and analyzing
the ways in which Muslim women are perceived in US and UK media, we must find and
critique the orientalist and gendered discourses abound in US and UK representations of
Muslim women.

Figure 1 Arabian Women With the Yachmak. [Postcards from The Colonial Harem] (left), Girl in the Blue Bra (right)

34

Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2013), 9.
35
Kainaz Amaria Facebook Twitter Tumblr Instagram, “‘Girl In The Blue Bra’ Symbol
Of Egypt’s Ongoing Strife,” NPR.org, accessed November 8, 2015,
http://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2011/12/21/144098384/the-girl-in-the-blue-bra.
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Figure 2 An opposition supporter at a rally for Mir Hussein Mousavi in Tehran before the general election last year
(right), Muslim women protesting the bombing and occupation of Palestine by Israel (left)36

The bodies of Arab and Muslim women within the Middle East serve as particular
points of focus in the US and UK media’s imagination based on both their gender and
location within the Orient. Through US media and pop culture in particular, we have seen
the production of Euro-US centric imaginings of Arab womanhood in visual mediums of
film, television, and the news—often reduced to either “erotic, romanticized, magical,
and sexualized, as with most images of belly dancers or harem girls, or they are portrayed
as helpless, silent, and utterly dominated by an excessive Arab patriarchy, as in
representations of the veiled woman or the harem slave”.37 Academic Amira Jarmakani
suggest that these constructions of Arab womanhood often come to “serve as an
immediately recognizable shorthand for larger themes of orientalist exoticism, licentious
sexuality, and heteromasculinist fantasies about owning and possessing women”.38 US
and UK media have created and reinforced what she calls cultural mythologies—“second
order sign systems, which have been unmoored from the particular conditions in which
they might traditionally be embedded and retooled as signifiers of dominant ideologies in
36

“The Myth of Iran’s Twitter Revolution,” The Guardian, June 11, 2010, sec. Comment
is free, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/11/iran-twitter-revolutionmyth.
37
Jarmakani, Imagining Arab Womanhood, 2.
38
Ibid.
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the U.S. cultural context in which they are created.”39 These cultural mythologies have
shifted since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and have been shifting with greater
intensity after 9/11 and the US and UK’s continued pursuit of their imperialist goals and
security issues as they relate to terrorism in the Middle East. While trite representations
of belly dancing women and genies still exist, other images such as the burqah clad Arab
woman are gaining popularity.
Feminist anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod focuses on “Western” media’s
portrayals of Muslim women and the implications these misrepresentations hold for our
societal understanding of the lives of Muslim women, especially the portrayal of the veil
as the symbol of women’s oppression within the Middle East.40 She notes that when
“Western” audiences are presented with images of the veiled woman they see, “the
Muslim woman does not have the same freedoms we have. The woman ruled by her
religion. The woman ruled by her men”.41 As it is well documented that most people
receive their information about ethno-racial groups from mass media, these images of
oppression are internalized by the Western public to define Arab women as oppressed
and Arab men as the oppressors.42 These heteromasculinist derived notions of Muslim
womanhood have also been used by US politicians such as President George W. Bush to
morally validate the military invasions of other nation-states such as Afghanistan and
later Iraq.43

39

Jarmakani, Imagining Arab Womanhood, 2.
Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, 17.
41
Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Muslim Woman: The Power of Images and the Danger of
Pity,” EuroZine, accessed October 28, 2015, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-0901-abulughod-en.html.
42
Watt, “Challenging Islamophobia Through Visual Media Studies”
43
Abu-Lughod, “The Muslim Woman: The Power of Images and the Danger of Pity.”
40
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Imagined Communities

Political scientist Benedict Anderson first created the concept of “imagined
community” as a means to analyze nationalism. An imagined community, unlike a
conventional community is not based on everyday face-to-face interaction among its
members, but is a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive
themselves as part of that group.44 Anderson believes that nations are an “imagined
political community”, “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion” and a community because
regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in
each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two
centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly
to die for such limited imaginings.45
In his text, Anderson suggests that media also plays a role in creating imagined
communities as it has the power to reach mass audiences and address the public. Similar
to the beliefs of Entman (1993), he sees the mass media’s use of images and vernacular
as means to perpetuate certain stereotypes while those who relate to such images are
further drawn to that imagined community.
Near East historian James Gelvin, identifies the creation of the world system of
nation-states as being one of the most defining characteristics of modern history and
suggests that this European-instigated trend would come to define the Middle East as we
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see it today.46 In studying the evolution of the great empires of the Middle East, the
Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, he shows how interconnected the histories of the West
and East really are. The development of a world economy has also contributed to the
formation of an interconnected history although European colonization and later Western
imperialism would create an imbalance through which they could manipulate and
dominate the Middle East. A relevant example of European domination in the Middle
East is the signing of the Sykes-Picot agreement.
The Sykes-Picot agreement, made between the British and French in 1916, and a
product of increased interaction between the East and West would forever change the
geography of the Middle East. This secret accord’s creation of so called “spheres of
influence” at the conclusion of World War I can directly be connected to the resistance
movements currently being undertaken by Palestinians and the Islamic State.47 In the case
of Palestine, this agreement would allow the British to take away the Palestinian people’s
right for self-determination resulting in large tracts of their land being taken for the
creation of Israel. Nationalists and resistance movements within Palestine fight to reassert
their right to self-determination, but also to protest and resist Israeli’s unlawful
occupation and continued settlement of their lands. The Islamic State’s rise can be
interpreted as a reaction to the continued European imposition of state and territory lines
as begun by the Sykes-Picot agreement and a desire to return to a pre-nation-state period
when Islamic caliphates ruled the region.
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Understanding the concept of imagined communities as well as the inception and
domination of the nation-state system is essential to this thesis as imposed nation-state
systems have greatly impacted the context within which the women included in this
thesis live and operate within. It is through groups’ resistance to the metaphorical carving
of the Middle East, that we can begin to see similarities between the movements of
Palestine and the Islamic State and the conflicts that have ensued. Although similarities
do exist we must remember that their long-term goals as well as their means of resisting
this system are very different. As these groups attempt to re-imagine their communities,
we also see the ways in which gender norms are also constructed and imagined to fit the
demands of their social, political, and economic contexts.
Women in State Formation

Deniz Kandiyoti, in her study entitled, “Identity and It’s Discontents: Women and
the Nation”, explores the the often contradictory implications nationalist projects have
had on women within post-colonial societies, at times enfranchising women and at other
times infringing upon their rights.48 She suggests it is the articulation of elements of
national identity and cultural difference that serve as a catalyst for nationalistic policies
which seek to control women. Iranian academic Minoo Moallem, in her book, Between
Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Politics of
Patriarchy in Iran, Moallem takes Kandiyoti’s notion further in suggesting that
controlling women’s dress and an emphasis on sexual honor, particularly within the
context of an Islamic society quickly becomes a sign of national honor. 49 She also draws
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on French philosopher Michel Foucault’s work Biopolitics in interpreting the body as “a
site where culture acts on individuals to turn them into subjects”.50 Bodies are important
sites of nationalist and religious imagining, when we look at women’s bodies within
Palestine and the Islamic state we find that they are “a site of political performance in the
particular context of modern nationalist and fundamentalist,” essential to their respective
imagined communities, but also open to manipulation by foreign media .51
Using Anderson’s descriptions of nationalism, Kandiyoti shows how the very
language of nationalism uses women as “the symbolic repository of group identity…
nationalism describes its object using either the vocabulary of kinship, motherland or
home in order to denote something to which something is nationally tied”.52 Nationalist
movements rely heavily on a gender regime, which allows leaders and dominant
ideologies to construct narratives of womanhood to benefit larger state-building goals, in
order to maintain their group identity. These same policies mobilize women when they
are needed for labor or to serve as fighters at the war front, but often force women to
return to domestic or subordinate roles within the public sphere as seen in Algeria’s fight
for independence. In my thesis I wish to highlight the ways in which women in the
Middle East both subvert and navigate the gender regimes that exist, particularly in times
of war and conflict, in their efforts to author their own stories and experiences.
Thesis Structure

In the first chapter of this thesis, I study women’s testimonies, histories, and
realities within Palestine and the Islamic State and how they can be used to rationalize
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women’s militancy. My analysis shows that these women’s engagement in armed
struggle is not not always something imposed on them, but is instead their participation in
armed struggle is better understood as falling into the larger context of an encounter.
These women encounter many systems of oppression and every day violence that they
must navigate in order to act according to their own free-will, particularly when
participating in larger movements that may not always focus or consider gender equality
to be a main goal.
In order to provide the most wholesome analysis possible, within the second
chapter I focus on the construction of gender roles by those in power in order to show
how the key actors and dominant ideologies within conflict instrumentalize women
through their constructed narratives of womanhood. Through this chapter we see that key
actors often act in a mirror image of foreign medias in positing their views of gender
roles with respect to the women who participate in conflict and war. As we peel off the
layers of what truly draw women into conflict, we gain clarity on women’s self-narrated
motives in partaking in and/or providing ideological support of militancy and armed
struggle as a form of resistance.
In the third and final chapter I closely examine US and UK media’s framing and
representation of women participating in and/or supporting armed resistance in Palestine
and The Islamic State, exposing how orientalist, sexism, and misunderstanding of Islam
inform their reporting. I believe that in order to truly understand the essence of female
militancy in the Middle East, we must keep their voices in the epicenter, but also consider
the local context, geopolitical context, and social structures within which these women
operate.
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Finally, in my conclusion I return to how US and UK media, Islamist, and
nationalist representations and constructions of womanhood mirror each other while often
masking women’s own agency as they navigate their cultural and political waters. In the
case of Palestine and the Islamic State, this masking complicates women’s attempts to
define their roles in larger struggles for both secular and Islamic statehood, selfhood, and
nationhood within larger contexts of conflict and upheaval in our post-colonial context.
Overall, I assert that women’s experiences in times of conflict and war in the Middle East
shows that gender roles are more fluid and dynamic than we often think.
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Chapter One
Gendered Encounters: Navigating Conflict and Resistance within Palestine and the
Islamic State
“Some women give their own souls; they fight and are martyred, even ordinary
women; this is a form of resistance.”
Dr. Mariam Saleh, an elected Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council53
As Lila Abu-Lughod points outs, Muslim women within the Middle East are often
seen as “victims of war and conflict”, but also victims of Islam and patriarchy which are
believed to restrict their roles within their societies.54 This overt focus on oppression and
victimization causes us to lose sight of the many proactive and essential roles that women
play within resistance movements and in times of war and conflict. Is it fair to conflate a
woman’s action within a society’s gender roles as inherently oppressive or lacking
agency without considering their contexts and lived realities? How can we gain a better
understanding of women’s roles in resistance movements without resorting to
stereotypical explanations when we see women in roles that cultural norms and
prejudices perceive as inherently male?55 “Western” discourse as presented through
media might fail to put these women into context before attempting to rationalize their
actions, but my analysis will concentrate on how women navigate these constructs.
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In this chapter, I use Patricia Hill Collin’s concept of “paradigm of difference”56
as the theoretical reasoning for framing women’s engagement in resistance movements as
an encounter that is both fluid and dynamic. I contend that women’s participation in
armed struggle emerges from a combination of various external and internal pressures
including military occupation, religious movements, and other details of the larger sociopolitical context of the Middle East.
Historical Perspectives: Women’s Armed Rebellion, Resistance, and Political Violence in
Palestine

The Israeli occupation of Palestine and subsequent conflict between Palestinians
and the Israeli state has birthed one of the longest standing resistance movements within
the Middle East and spans much of the twentieth century into the current twenty-first
century. While some sources try to frame the conflict as between religious groups—Jews
and Muslims, this conflict is based in a fight for territory and the right to exercise
political control over it. Female militancy within Palestine has been well documented
both by external and local media sources and provides a strong and historic case study for
the representations of Middle Eastern women as active participants in war and conflict.
Palestinian women have played a consistent role in the nationalist movement in Palestine,
struggling beside Palestinian men in the fight for both the creation of a Palestinian nation
and the right for displaced Palestinians to return. Understanding the history of military
occupation and the process of settler colonialism that continues to impact Palestinian’s
way of life is essential to any critique of media framing of Palestinian women’s struggles
to resist.

56

Patricia Hill Collins, “Toward a New Vision: Race, Class, and Gender as Categories of
Analysis and Connection,” Race, Sex & Class 1, no. 1 (1993): 25–45.

Koranteng 27
Understanding Palestinian women’s long history of struggle and resistance in
relation to its unique socio-political context is a process that much feminist literature has
failed to do. Without looking at this larger history and the relevant factors that continue to
impact women’s participation in struggle, including military struggle, we lose valuable
insight into the “‘many forms of gendered resistance’ …[for] since the early days of the
Palestinian national struggle, a distinctive expression of women’s resistance against
invasion, colonisation and humiliation has gradually evolved.”57 The increasing
participation of women in more visible combatant roles and in the larger women’s
autonomous movement did not emerge within a vacuum, but was and continues to be
shaped and influenced by a larger global context and history of domination.58 As we will
see, Palestinian women have and continue to participate in the Palestinian nationalist
movement in the ways that they see fit while attempting to cope with “Israel’s
unrelenting brutal policies of economic strangulation, political suffocation and the social
destruction it has and continues to wreak on the Palestinians”.59 The historical trajectory
and dynamics of Palestinian women’s resistance must be understood in relation to not
only their Israeli occupiers, but also the gender hierarchy that prevails within Palestinian
society.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century different
peoples began to come together and form nations that could support their rights of selfdetermination and rule. In 1882 Jewish people across the world also began to organize
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under the Zionist movement, which called for the creation of a Jewish homeland.60
Zionist Jews quickly began to seek out a location for their homeland and eventually chose
Palestine, as it was the first site for the Jewish people as described by their holy book.61
While Zionism created a national consciousness for Jews, it differed greatly from the
beliefs of early immigrants who followed the Orthodox religious practices and spent most
of their time studying. Those that would come after them, especially around the start of
World War I were more secular and arrived with the goal of creating a Jewish State.62
Whilst these more secular migrants used Zionism to facilitate ideals of Jewish
nationalism, Palestinians and other Arabs were also developing a national consciousness
of their own.
At the start of World War I, Palestine was still part of territory held by the
weakening Ottoman Empire—a territory that Husayn ibn ‘Ali, the patriarch of the
Hashemite family, increasingly wanted for the Arabs. After brokering a deal with the
British, the Arabs led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire and won, beginning the British
mandate in Palestine. When the Ottoman Empire fell at the end of World War I, France
and Britain were able to gain “quasi-colonial authority” within the region through the
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mandate system. Contrary to the agreement originally made between the Hashemites and
Britain, the Arab territories were split up through the secret Sykes-Picot agreement and
Transjordan and the Palestinian mandate were created. This same Palestinian mandate
would later be appropriated as the “Jewish Homeland” as promised in the Balfour
Declaration of 1917. The vast displacement that would follow, served as a catalyst for
many social and political movements amongst the Palestinian people.
Palestinian women’s activism can be traced back to the 1920s when Palestinian
women first began officially to organize in 1921 with the creation of the Palestinian
Women’s Union.63 Although the creation of this union was a predominantly upper- and
middle- class project, it remains an important example of women’s coming together to
demonstrate opposition of the continued Zionist migration that was threatening their
home and existence.64 These same women would go on to lead a demonstration against
the Balfour Declaration and organize the first General Palestinian Women’s Congress in
Jerusalem in 1929.65 Later during the 1936-39 revolt, Palestinian women occupied many
diverse roles ranging from being caretakers for the injured and hiding rebels to publically
demonstrating and taking up arms to defend their land, but their roles were still inhibited
by the gender expectations of Palestine’s more conservative society.66 Throughout this
time, “legal and illegal coercive measures”, including Great Britain’s Land Transfer
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ordinance of 1920, which created many new land regulations biased towards Zionist
settlers under the new British mandate.67 Zionist settlers’ used other tools of oppression
including “taxation, imprisonment, and collective punishment” of Palestinians, that were
used to seize Palestine’s cultivated land as well as economically, politically, and socially
to strangle the Palestinian people.68
Al-Nakbah: Gender and Statelessness

Many Israelis commemorate 1948 as the birth of the Jewish homeland, much
needed after the atrocities committed against Jews during the Second World War. On the
other hand, Palestinians and other Arabs reflect on this year and are overcome with a
sense of loss—for 1948 was as al-Nakbah, or the catastrophe. After al-Nakbah, life
within Palestine was altered as villages were destroyed and large groups of Palestinians
were forced into exile. In 1948, only about 150,000 Palestinians remained in the area that
became the State of Israel. Following the war of 1948–1949, this land was divided into
three parts: The State of Israel, the West Bank (of the Jordan River) and the Gaza Strip.
For Palestinians living within the new state of Israel, identities would become
exponentially more complicated as they were now labeled “the present-absentees” by
Israeli law. They were granted Israeli citizenship and the right to vote, but in many
respects they were and remain second-class citizens, since Israel defines itself as a Jewish
state and the state of the Jewish people. Over the years, thousands of other Palestinians
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Figure 3 Maps of Palestine from 1948-2010 [http://www.jvpchicago.org/resources/brief-history]

It is in 1948 that we see Palestinian womanhood greatly politicized. Like their
male counterparts, al-Nakbah was a period characterized by massacres, forced exile,
displacement, and eviction as the newly formed Israeli state’s conduct is often considered
to be a case of ethnic cleansing.69 In this traumatic time, women began simultaneously to
assume responsibilities for the family and nation.70 As Margaret Gonzalez- Perez points
out, “the discrimination and segregation of Palestinians in general, and of Palestinian
women in particular, is integral to the colonization process as women are considered to
be the "boundary markers" of Palestinian social and sexual property.”71 Women’s
immediate responses to al-Nakbah included directing most of their energies toward relief
69
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efforts and “support within the framework of charitable societies and organizations”
furthermore “‘to cope with the huge influx of refugees and help the people deal with the
effects of dispossession’ which could be interpreted as a domestication of women’s
roles”.72 Palestinian women’s strategies of assuming more domestic roles within their
society represents a sort of patriarchal bargain of sorts,73 but also emphasizes that gender
can be used to “mediate the process of coping for survival”.74 It is within the aftermath of
al-Nakbah that the birth of political organizations and the rise of women’s political
resistance in the joining of new nationalist political movements took place. From 1948
until 1967 women joined groups such as Al-Fatah, the Arab National Movement, AlBaath, and the Jordanian Communist Party.75

Figure 4 General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW)
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Regional Conflicts: Women and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In 1967, the overwhelming defeat of the Arab regimes and Israeli occupation of
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem and the PLO’s subsequent takeover by
guerrilla groups from 1968-69 changed the Palestinian political landscape.76 The PLO’s
newly adopted charter quickly moved to defined armed struggle as the "only strategy for
the liberation of Palestine" and martyrdom became the ultimate act of sacrifice and
courage. This new strategy in symphony with the harsh realities of occupation and a need
to resist caused a relaxing in social rules and roles that enabled Palestinian women to join
guerrilla groups and further expanded women’s opportunities for political resistance
through armed struggle.77 In May 1967, four Palestinians, including two men hijacked a
Sabena Airlines plane in Brussels and forced it to land at Lod, drawing international
attention to the plight of Palestinians. Also as a product of this new emphasis on armed
struggle, women in the PFLP had their own training camps in Jordan and in Lebanon, as
well as separate women’s sections, until the early 1980s.78
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Figure 5 Dalal Mughrabi, the leader of a Military operation near Tel Aviv in 1978

On March 11th, 1978, Dalal Mughrabi79 at the age of nineteen, lead a group
sailing from from Lebanon to participate in a string of attacks along Israel’s main coastal
highway from Haifa to Tel-Aviv.80 Mughrabi was a member of al-Asifah, a resistance
organization that concentrated on armed struggle as a means for liberation.81 Mughrabi’s
death during the operation shot her to stardom with the Palestinian people hailing her as a
heroine and a martyr. To this day she is still honored by many Palestinians who believe
that she “sacrifice[d] for her country and is a symbol for every Palestinian girl.”82 The
“Martyr Kamal Adwan Operation”, as it was named by al-Asifah, left 36 Israelis dead,
and is still considered one of the deadliest attacks in Israeli history and occurred within a
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larger context of “political despair and hegemonic silencing”.83 While there were
significant causalities on both sides, the operation was part of a highly strategic political
move since the resistance occurred on the eve of then-Prime minister Menachem Begin’s
trip for peace talks with Egypt.84 Although their attempts to derail the Israeli-Egyptian
peace talks failed, Mughrabi’s participation in acts of political resistance through armed
struggle is just one of many examples of Palestinian women’s continued negotiation of
aspects of their normative historical gender roles, responsibilities, and relations.
The First Intifada, Second Intifada, and Beyond: Challenging Occupation

The first Intifada began on December 9th, 1987, women and men stood side by

side in a democratic and grassroots movement that brought all sectors of Palestinian
society together to rebel against their Israeli occupiers.85 Little girls and little boys could
often be seen throwing rocks at Israeli defense forces. Although the call for an
independent Palestinian state was a call to men and women alike, shifts in the local
context would eventually cause women to step back from the forefront of the
movement.86 During the First intifada, “the burden of occupation”, challenged traditional
Palestinian gender roles, making room for “Palestinian women [to have] a political voice
and strengthened their role in society as heads of households, as political and
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environmental activists, and as intermediaries between the Israeli army and
Palestinian youth’.”87
The signing of 1993 Oslo Accords was the first of many agreements and accords
that were based on creating peace within Palestine and Israel, but for the most part only
upheld the Israeli status quo.88 When the Second Intifada had begun in 2000, Palestinians
continued to face overt discrimination and occupation. Additionally, Palestinian political
parties Fatah and Hamas controlling of the movement largely limited and curtailed
Palestinian women’s ability to freely participate in public resistance.89 The increasingly
militant Islamic forms of resistance, which came to dominate the al-Aqsa intifada quickly
began to place restrictions on women’s dress and mobility—stifling women’s
participation in any type of public resistance.90 Ironically, in January 2002, during the
growing restrictions placed on women’s participation, Wafa Idris became the first female
Palestinian martyr when she went on her martyrdom mission.91 This seeming
contradiction challenges the effectiveness of Palestinian men restricting Palestinian
women’s movement and ability to participate in armed struggle due to their
interpretations of gender norms, but it is important to remember from the broader context
that Chechen women were the first Islamic females to engage in militancy, clearing the
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way for other Islamic females to engage in jihad.92 As Maria Holt points out, ‘male
control’ is by no means absolute; it is conditioned by the framework of the Israeli
Occupation and by women’s actions on their own behalf that challenge unquestioning
male dominance not rooted in authentic cultural practices”.93 From 2000 to 2005, eight
Palestinian women94 followed in Idris’ footsteps in order to resist threats to familial
stability and the potential nationhood of the Palestinian people.95
Palestinian women have and continue to frame their frustrations and desire to
participate in armed struggles as a reaction to the various ways in which the Israeli
occupation and other regional political actors have and continue to compromise their
personal security, right to life, economic independence, and the larger issue of Palestine’s
larger right to self-determination. The realities of occupation are felt by all:
To be honest, when it comes to the impact of Israel’s siege and colonial
policies on the people of Gaza, indeed all of Palestine, I do not think that
the experiences of men and women differ from each other. When Israel
deliberately bombards schools, both males and females are affected. When
talking about the limits Israel forces upon our aspirations, both genders
share the same suffering. The Israeli government acts with indifference to
the Palestinian population. The same lethal policies are applied to men,
women and children in an indiscriminate manner.96
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The daily trauma faced by Palestinians, is bound to incite both feelings of hopelessness
and a desire to engage in resistance regardless of gender. Cynthia Ness argues that over
the past several decades, the use of violence has been granted a new degree of legitimacy
in traditional as well as modern society as the product of larger structural and cultural
changes.97 As “the blurring of private and public space” continues to occur in Palestinian
society, there has been a democratization of violence with women’s participation in
armed struggle, particularly martyrdom mission, gradually becoming an accepted form of
resistance.98 What is a woman to do when neither the kitchen nor the street is free of
insecurity and danger?
Palestinian women do not interpret their participation in armed struggle as a
naïve over reaction or a meaningless act of revenge, but as a form of political agency, for
their use of violence is “driven by conditions, context and language that are unique to the
setting in which it [has] emerge[d]”.99 While some Palestinian women have found
strategies such as mothering, reproducing, and serving as keepers of collective memory to
be effective in resistance, others have made the deeply personal decision to make their
bodies a weapon, “renegotiating aspects of their normative historical gender roles,
responsibilities, and relations” in the ultimate sacrifice.100
Andaleeb Takatkeh, a young woman from the West Bank, not only participated in
political violence to hurt her occupiers, but “her actions [also] filled the void left by the
inaction of Arab leaders”, when she went on a martyrdom mission in 2002. In her widely
shared last message to the world, Takatkeh said “’I’ve chosen to say with my body what
97

Cindy D. Ness, “The Rise in Female Violence,” Daedalus 136, no. 1 (2007): 84–93.
Ness, “The Rise in Female Violence.”
99
Ibid.
100
Muhanna, Agency and Gender in Gaza, 14.
98

Koranteng 39
Arab leaders have failed to say… My body is a barrel of gunpowder that burns the
enemy.’”101 In her martyrdom, her body was no longer an object to be manipulated or
objectified, but a political weapon that voiced the frustrations and injustices endured by
Palestinians as a people. Her critique of Arab states draws attention to both the continued
silence of regional powers and their unwillingness to engage with Israel in a more active
and militaristic manner. Takatkeh most likely came to the same conclusion that many
other Palestinians, both men and women have drawn—with the imbalance of power
between Palestine and Israel, conventional warfare is not a viable option. Passivity is not
an option, for as Palestinian American activist Eman Khaleq puts it, “We don’t do this
(protest and resist) for the fame or the protest photo; we struggle because our lives
depend on it.”102 For some, the anti-colonial struggle must be waged through means of
violence.103
Once again, Palestinian women have gained public attention for their most recent
participations in armed struggles following the bloody and destructive attacks on Gaza
during the IDF’s operation Protective Edge of the summer of 2014 when more than 2,200
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were left dead and an estimated 20,000 Palestinian homes destroyed.104 In October of
2015, a little more than a year after the war, Tuesday, October 13th was declared a “day
of rage” with both men and women alike taking to the streets in many different cities to
protest the Israeli occupation.105 Photos106 capturing the crowing unrest show women
with traditional Palestinian kuffiyehs covering their faces as they use slingshots to throw
rocks at Israeli soldiers.

Figure 6 Palestinian Protesters throw stones during clashes in the West Bank city of Bethlehem [Abed Al
Hashlamoun/EPA]

During the months of October and November of 2015, it is believed that women
and girls accounted for about 20 percent of all Palestinian attackers.107 During this same
period, Israeli authorities say that young women including three teenagers participated in
armed struggle through stabbing, attempting to stab, or intending to stab Israeli soldiers
104
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or civilians.108 I believe that the adoption of assertive behaviors is a response to “the
stark imbalance of power between Israelis and Palestinians” which has meant that
“conventional warfare is out of the question and therefore Palestinians have been forced
to seek alternative methods to wage their anti-colonial struggle.”109 Young woman are
playing an increasingly large role in armed struggle as they struggle to make sense of the
persecution of their people—the deaths of their family members, the restriction of their
movement, and the lack of economic opportunities within their communities. How should
one cope with these types of realities? When you cannot imagine a future where you do
not live in fear, hopelessness, or the desire to resist?
The plethora in Palestinian women’s expressions of resistance can be understood
by recognizing that windows of opportunity and the changing political context affect
different categories of Palestinian women differently, thus producing distinct
manifestations of resistance. Palestinian women, much like their male counterparts
grapple with the insecurities of life whether it be as a second class citizen in the Jewish
state of Israel or as a colonial subject within the Palestinian territories. The current
generation of Palestinian woman have only known life under occupation;
The main reason for insecurity is the Israeli occupation. It is possible that while you

are sitting inside your house, it will be destroyed by a [missile]. I do not feel
secure enough to send my kids to school for the same reason. I am not able to
move freely or even go to visit my friends due to that. Everywhere you are at risk
for Israeli attacks.
University Student, Village (Gaza Strip)110
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Young Palestinians have only known the wasted time spent at check points, the
home demolitions, the late night arrests, and the deafening silence of surrounding Arab
countries as they build refugee camps for Palestinians.
Peace processes have and continue to fail Palestinians. As the prominent
Palestinian psychiatrist and activist Dr. Eyad Sarraj said when speaking on the rise of
suicide bombing amongst Palestinians, “We have tried the United Nations and its
Security Council, which by the way have made excellent resolutions on our behalf. For
example Resolution 194111 calling on Israel to allow us to return to our homeland, but to
no avail. So we kept wandering around, between airports and refugee camps, waiting for
a hero or an earthquake. All we wanted was to go home.”112 The Camp David accords
have not prevented the occupation and continued settlement of Israelis on Palestinian
land. Egypt and Syria’s losses to Israel proved early on that even they could not save
Palestine. International systems for justice have failed Palestine and can easily be seen as
a lost cause. These women’s desire to participate in armed struggle should be considered
abnormal when Palestinian women already have a past of being martyrs and resistors
who have dedicated their lives to fighting for the recognition of Palestinian’s equal right
to land, life and pursuit of happiness.
The Rise of the Islamic State

Since its declaration of creating an Islamic State in June of 2014, the self-named
Islamic State (IS) has played a large part in the continuation of violence and conflict in
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the Middle East as part of the group’s stated goal of creating a transnational caliphate, an
area exclusively under the rule and authority of a Muslim leader.113 Various sources have
come up with different frames for understanding the rise of IS, with “Terrorism experts
view[ing] IS as an al-Qaida offshoot and attribute the absence of spectacular attacks to
date to what they view as a lack of organizational capacity. [In addition], [c]riminologists
see IS as a mafia-like holding company out to maximize profit” and “Scholars in the
humanities point to the apocalyptic statements by the IS media department, its
glorification of death and the belief that Islamic State is involved in a holy mission”114.
When looking at the rise of the organization I follow the analysis of scholar Nelly
Lahoud which suggests that, “the evolution of the IS is best understood as an outcome of
both design and accidents” within a particularly tumultuous political landscape.115 The
group is highly organized with the group’s territorial gains and governance structure
being metered out according to its interpretations of Islamic teachings—all parts of their
plan for building a caliphate. IS is also the product of “accidents” in the political games
in the region which have allowed the created advantageous conflicts, political instability,
and military landscape within the Middle East and North Africa that the group now
exploits.116 Its diverse sources of funding which include oil, donations, and war loot has
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and continues to provide the group with the money needed to govern and provide social
services for the people within its territory.117
The Islamic State is led by the “previously little-known preacher named Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi” who proclaimed himself head of the caliphate, the Islamic State,
immediately demanded the loyalty of Muslims worldwide in 2014, encouraging them to
immigrate and join the Ummah, the Islamic religious community, in IS territory.118 AlBaghdadi has been presented to be “a descendant of the tribe of Quraysh” Abu
Muhammad al-‘Adnani the former cleric and spokesperson for Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL), which is one of seven conditions to qualify for the office of caliph
according to classical Sunni scholars.119 Under his leadership, the Islamic State has been
“the perpetrator of choreographed outrages, the enslaver of women, the looter of antiquity
and the purveyor of vicious sectarianism”, with the help of its estimated 35,000 legions
who both serve as combatants and administrators in its constructed state-like apparatus
centered in Raqqa, Syria.120 Al-Baghdadi has made it clear that for those fighting for IS
“ejecting infidels and apostates through jihad comes first, but holding the community
together after this is accomplished comes next.”121
The Islamic State is “frequently described as an offshoot of al-Qaeda, in order to
locate the group at the extreme end of the jihadi spectrum, which in turn is at the fringes
of Sunni Islamism, both in terms of its puritanical or Salafi doctrine and its rigid
117
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enforcement of same”.122 It is very important to understand that while IS’ does promote a
certain brand of Islam, it in no way has the power to define what Islam is for the millions
of Muslims around the world. For the most part, the group disregards Sunni jurisprudence
and similar to its predecessor al-Qaeda, “IS justifies its violence against non-Muslims
with the idea that they are infidels (kuffar) and its attacks on Muslims, including Sunnis,
with the notion of takfir or excommunication”.123 The Islamic State does not seek
membership in the United Nations and has no desire to be part of the global community
of nation-states.124 Accordingly to the Islamic State’s, not only do Western forces need to
be removed from the region, but regional players also cannot be trusted. For example,
“The Syrian regime and Iran [are] vilifie[d] as rawafid or refusers of true Islam because
[the Islamic State] identifies them with Shi‘ism; the Russians [IS] hates as godless
supporters of Assad; the Turks and Gulf Arabs [IS] disdains as handmaidens of the West,
like the rest of the opposition in Syria, particularly the Kurdish militias”.125 IS seeks to
resist and rebel against the larger nation-state system and its creation such as the 1916
Sykes-Picot Agreement and “redraw today’s world map and create a global Islamic state,
a caliphate”.126 If we define states as “entities that claim a monopoly on violence,
provid[ing] basic services and promulgate an ideology” and recognize that “in their
founding moments, states-in-the-making that seek absolute sovereignty may orchestrate
spectacles of extraordinary violence not just to deter the violence of others but also to
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smother all forms of dissent,” the Islamic State can and should be viewed as a statebuilding movement although arguably more violent and destructive than the case of
Palestine127.

Figure 7 Islamic State sanctuary as of December 2015, with IS gains in Syria during 2015 indicated [Institute of the
Study of War and Business Insider]

Iraq

The Islamic State’s presence in Iraq can be traced back to Abu Mus’ab alZarqawi’s 2004 establishment of al-Qaeda in Iraq when combatants were first enlisted to
fight against the US occupation of Iraq as well as the Iraqi government which was seen as
being filled with Shi’a political parties that took over in 2005.128 IS’ growth within Iraq
can de directly related to two causes; “the political sectarianism that was introduced by
the 2005 constitution and the forced displacement (tahjir qasri) of people on the basis of
religious affiliation to create a demographic map along sectarian lines”129 After the
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dissolving of Saddam Hussein’s government, many Baathists who had been army and
intelligence officers were left without unemployed, ostracized, and would find that they
had no place within the new government.130 One scholar of Iraqi politics, Saad Jawad,
believes that the US ousting of Saddam Hussein as well as his government “reduc[ed] the
Iraqi state to a collection of Shi’as, Sunnis, Kurds and other minorities,” which provided
causation for “the new constitution emphasis[ing] differences and divisive issues rather
than focusing on the uniting elements of Iraqi society.”131 The increase in sectarianism
within Iraq and its domination within political discourse allowed different Shia and Sunni
militant groups to form and eventually displace people—furthering sectarian schisms
within Iraqi society. IS took advantage of this rise in sectarianism particularly during the
Maliki government when Iraqis demonstrated in 2012 and 2013 against the government.
When peaceful protest became violent, IS combatants attempted to join the fight with
their Sunni brethren in Ramadi in January 2014, only to be pushed out. Later, IS would
attack and overtake the city of Mosul in the Nineveh province, beginning their reign of
terror in Iraq.132
Jihadis and ex-Baath political party members have come to play a large role in the
Islamic States operation and military efforts in Iraq. Their partnership between Baathists
and Salafi Jihadism is an old one, connected to Saddam Hussein’s “faith campaign” in an
attempt to “portray himself and his regime as protectors of (Sunni) Muslim piety” in the
1990’s due large military and economic losses following his ill-fated invasion of
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Kuwait.133 Their combined forces have given the man power as well as military strategy
to continue and grow their operation in Iraq. From November 2011 to May 2014 (before
the IS’s advance into Mosul), the IS self-reported over 19,000 military operations in Iraq
alone.134
Syria

In 2011, Syrians took to the street to protest the al-Assad regime as the citizens of
other Arab nations such as Tunisia and Egypt were beginning to openly protest their
dictators.135 The movement, part of the so called Arab Spring, has led to the development
of a 5 year civil war in Syria—one that continues to be intensified and prolonged due to
foreign interventions and proxies. The rise of the Islamic State in Syria has been far more
subtle than its growing influence in Iraq, with the group infiltrating northern Syrian
communities through Dawah centers which began opening in 2013.136 The Dawah centers
were described as being “innocent looking missionary offices, not unlike the ones that
Islamic charities have opened worldwide” and were open to all members of the
community. As soon as IS was able to find enough recruits to serve as spies it began to
expand its presence and participate in military operations absorbing fighters from other
Jihadi organizations and eliminating rivals through blackmail and assassination.137
The Islamic State’s military wings in Syria were initially filled with foreign
fighters who were immigrating to the region to join in the fight against the Assad regime.
These fighters who had begun entering the region in 2012, would assist IS in one of its
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largest territory acquisitions with the taking of al-Raqqa, Syria, the working capital of the
caliphate that has been mostly under control of the IS since January 2014.138 Once a
“sleepy provincial city on the Euphrates river” al-Raqqa and its people were infiltrated
and then forcibly subjugated to IS’ rule of the city—taking advantage of the political
uncertainty within the country. While IS has made some progress in gaining territory in
Syria, in December of 2013 both secular Syrian brigades from across the country and the
Islamist group al-Nusra Front joined together to wage war against the IS.139
In the case of Syria, IS benefits greatly from its status as a second tier threat with
Assad regime forces as well as opposition groups fighting amongst themselves, the fight
against IS has not given as much attention as it deserves. The only group to fully and
effectively fight against IS has been the Kurdish forces, who push IS out of Kobane and
the areas bordering Turkey.140 As we see in the examples of Syria and Iraq, IS has and
continues to thrive because of the instability within these countries and the inability for
sounds plans for national reconciliation to be reached.
Recreating the Islamic Ummah: Women’s Voices in the Islamic State

As a fairly new resistance movement, scholarly work on the Islamic State is still
forthcoming—particularly women’s accounts on their experiences living within IS
territory. While this lack of information does limit the amount of study and analysis that
can be done on Muslim women’s voices within the Islamic State, the experiences of
Palestinian women can inform the questions and concentrations in future academics
pursuit of this topic. As a transnational movement that has been forcibly taking control of
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territory within many nation states and attracts supporters from all over the world,
emerging accounts of women’s experiences from IS territory must be closely and further
analyzed. Although women within the Islamic State are currently restricted to roles of
support within the Islamic State, many have made it evident that they would like to
participate in armed struggle. Trends amongst current experiences can shed light on
women of the Islamic State’s potential progression to filling more combat roles. As in the
case of Palestine, there are many diverse experiences and motivations for women desiring
to participate in or directly supporting armed struggle in the Islamic State. Is their
resistance a means of survival, as a political weapon, or something altogether different?
What aspects of these women’s lived realities might attract women to seek out armed
struggle on behalf of the Islamic State? Using existing accounts from women who are
currently or have been associated with the Islamic State, I wish to begin answering some
of these questions in an attempt to better understand the diversity of activism that exists
within the Islamic State.
Khadijah Dare

In 2014 soon after the beheading of American journalist James Foley, Khadijah
Dare became one of the most prominent female faces of the Islamic State when, she
posted a tweet on social media openly seeking to participate in jihad. The then 22-yearold convert from Lewisham, south London, tweeted; “Any links 4 da execution of da
journalist plz. Allahu Akbar. UK must b shaking up haha. I wna b da [sic] 1st UK woman
2 kill a UK or US terorrist!” pledging to do what no other woman within the Islamic State
had done yet—fully participate in armed struggle.141 Her fame only grew as it later
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became clear that she and her husband were the stars of a short documentary piece filmed
in Syria, focusing on their lives on the war front and respective transitions from England
and Sweden. In the film Khadijah, who then was going by the alias of Maryam, was
filmed shooting guns and discussing weapons with her fighter husband as it told the story
of her leaving her friends and family behind at home to make hijrah to Syria.
During one of many interviews, Khadijah frames her leaving England as a
journey to find a husband who was “willing to just sacrifice their life in this world for the
life in the hereafter.”142 Throughout the rest of the short documentary, Khadijah continues
to justify her actions as well as those of her husband as a religious duty, even urging other
Muslims to “stop being so selfish...focusing on your families or studies” and entreats
them to emulate her and immigrate to Syria and join the holy war.143 In other segments
she additionally describes her husband’s duty “to liberate the country”, a central theme
throughout the documentary. When questioned about being classified as a terrorist, she
responds that,
We haven’t invaded any land. Taken their houses, their food, raping their
women, killing their men, we haven’t done that. The Muslims have not
done that. It’s the people who have come to us who have done that. And
yet we are called the terrorists.144
Khadijah’s explanation of why she should not be labelled a terrorist, speak to a question
Rafia Zakaria poses in her article, “Women and Islamic Militancy”; “Is it possible that
ISIS appeals to some Muslim women, not because they are fooled by it, but because its
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political vision seems to offer solutions to some of their problems?”145 Khadijah’s
response to the question of being a terrorist is filled with the rhetoric of liberation of
Muslim people and critiques the poor treatment of her Muslim brothers and sisters in
Syria and supports Zakaria’s conclusion that for many the Islamic State provides “an
escape from both the ghettoized status of Islam in the West as well as the restrictive
cultural mores of many Muslim countries; just as crucially, it can also seem like a
legitimate response to being victimized by U.S.-led wars that promise female
empowerment but deliver widespread destruction.”146
Khadijah also speaks of prejudice being an issue that impacted her decision to
leave England for Syria saying that, “Before I used to wear the face veil it was fine, but
when I started to cover my face people used to say ‘go back to your country’. I used to
reply, ‘I was born around the corner’.”147 Her newly found faith and her practice of it
made her feel ostracized and to a certain extent a stranger in her own land. In her article
“Jihad and Girl Power: How ISIS Lured 3 London Girls”, Katrin Bennhold posits the
following, “In post-9/11 austerity Britain, a time when a deep crisis of identity and values
has swept the country, fitting in can be harder for Muslim girls than for boys…[Muslim
girls] see Western fashions sexualizing girls from an early age, while Western feminists
look at the hijab as a symbol of oppression.”148 Her arguments highlights how England’s
specific cultural context which is filled with xenophobic and imperialist rhetoric
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contributed to Khadijah and possibly other Muslim women’s decision to make hijrah
(emigrate) and join the Islamic State.149 With the ‘liberation’ from the secular life in
places like England, the ability to marry a jihadi, and to create a sense of belonging
within the caliphate that the Islamic State seems to provide, it becomes easier to
understand one woman’s draw to join the Islamic State. Interestingly, despite the many
abilities that the Islamic State provides women like Khadijah, who have migrated from
“Western” countries, the ability to openly practice their faith, the gender hierarchy
present with the group and the host culture of Syria still restricts women’s roles to a more
domestic realm—preventing women from truly engaging in armed struggle.
Shams

Shams is the alias of another type of woman in the Islamic State, highlighting
those who migrate to territories of the Islamic State as a means of fulfilling what they
consider to be a religious duty, but additionally supports the Islamic State through their
professional skills. 150 The 26-year-old Malaysian, is known for her diary of the time she
claims she has spent in the Islamic State-held cities Taqba and Raqqa using various forms
of social media to share details about her marriage to a Morocco-born jihadi with the nom
de guerre Abu Baraa.151 On several occasions, Shams shared posts with pictures about
jihad as well as words of encouragement for other women contemplating hijrah to join
the Islamic State on her now removed Tumblr blog entitled Dairy Of A Muhajirah (“one
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who has emigrated”).152 Her role as a doctor was something that Shams made highly
public and actually states that she first travelled to Syria in order to use her medical
expertise to treat wounded jihadis.153

Figure 8 Shams Facebook post: Dairy Of A Muhajirah154

Shams’ comments show a dedication to the ideals of the Islamic State and a love

for Jihad saying, “'A life without jihad is like drinking sea water. It keeps you thirsty &
cause you dehydrated [sic]. That's the condition of our Ummah [international Muslim
community] today.'155 While Shams rarely addresses “western” governments as the
enemies of ‘true Muslims’ within the Islamic State she does speak about the Islamic State
ensuring the correct practice of Sharia law for all Muslims in the region.
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Figure 9 Tweet by Shams

Figure 10 Facebook: Diary Of A Muhajirah

For Shams, her draw to the Islamic State is very much rooted in the community
provided by the Islamic State. Within the territory of the Islamic State and as the wife of
a jihadi, she is part of the Ummah, or Islamic community, that the group claims to
represent. As an individual dedicated to this community and the idea of martyrdom being
both the ultimate expression of her faith and a means of defending the Ummah—if given
the opportunity, she might pursue an armed role within the Islamic State’s resistance
movement.
“Khadija”
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The rise of the Islamic State and its forcible seizure of lands throughout the
Middle East has drastically changed the lives of many people living within the region.
For those trying to survive within the Islamic State’s brutal and authoritarian rule,
becoming active in the organization is a means of stability within the civil unrest of the
Syrian War. As Khadija’s story shows, there are stark differences between the lives of
women who migrate to join the Islamic State and those whose lives are turned upside
down when their towns are over taken or they are displaced by the lack of economic
prospects.
Khadija was one of many Syrians who joined peaceful protests against the
government of President Bashar al-Assad after the Syrian uprising began five years ago.
In an interview with a CNN reporter she described her life immediately after the uprising
saying, “Everything around us was chaos… Free Syrian Army, the regime, barrel bombs,
strikes, the wounded, clinics, blood -- you want to tear yourself away, to find something
to run to…My problem was I ran away to something uglier."156 As life and the realities of
civil unrest weighed on Khadija she began talking to an Islamic State fighter who
described the group as “…going to properly implement Islam.”157 After living with such
uncertainty, Khadija got in contact with a cousin who told her that she could join her and
her Islamic State-affiliated husband in Raqqa and become a member of the al-Khanssaa
brigade where her cousin worked in.
Khadija was able to talk her family into moving to Raqqa, but this would be a
choice that she would later regret. In her new role, Khadija policed other women within
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Raqqa, making sure that they were dressed and behaving according to the Islamic States
rules. For pay, she received $200 a month and received food rations—an ample amount
for a single woman. When reflecting on her time in the brigade she said, "At the start, I
was happy with my job. I felt that I had authority in the streets. But then I started to get
scared, scared of my situation. I even started to be afraid of myself.”158 Discouraged by
the brutality of Islamic State leaders toward all those under its rule including women, she
eventually made the decision to leave the Islamic State. Khadija saw first-hand how “The
Al Khansaa Brigade illustrates well the twofaced nature of ISIS ‘feminism.’ On the one
hand, it offers leadership roles and empowerment for women. On the other hand, it
enforces inherently antifeminist policies”, further emphasizing the groups gender
hierarchy.159
Syrian Women of al-Khanssaa

In a 2015 New York Times article, three Syrian women, all former members of
the Islamic State morality police who escaped to Turkey were interviewed about their
experiences both together and separately, over the course of two multiday visits.160 All
three women spoke of living independent lives prior to the Syrian uprising and the
Islamic States seizure of their hometown of Ruqqa about which they observed, “Syrians
[have] become second-class citizens — at best…Not only had Raqqa residents become
subjects of the Organization’s mostly Iraqi leadership, but their place in society fell even
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further overnight.”161 While none of the women believed in the Islamic States ideology,
they did all become members of the al-Khanssaa brigade, undergoing compulsory
military and religious training together. As the reporter summarizes, “In the moment,
each choice seemed like the right one, a way to keep life tolerable: marrying fighters to
assuage the Organization and keep their families in favor; joining the Khansaa Brigade to
win some freedom of movement and an income in a city where women had been stripped
of self-determination.”162
Each of the women eventually came to see that their roles within the Islamic State
would not guarantee them a new life of happiness. While joining the al-Khanssaa brigade
gave these women power, as their time within the brigade went on, Asma, Dua, and Aws
began to see that their power would always be restricted in accordance to their
nationality. As Aws explained, ““As women, our status depended on his [their husband’s]
status, among the male fighters, this had been clear from the beginning: Salaries, cars,
neighborhoods and housing were allocated in large part by nationality”.163 In a time of
uncertainty, these women craved power and stability, but only saw prejudice and
injustice. As the months went on they realized that in actuality the Islamic State had
become an authoritarian monster. They saw a group with no real outlet to voice
grievances and that stoned a woman when she held up a sign protesting against the
Islamic State in front of a police station, justifying her punishment by falsely accusing
her of adultery. Their reality became bleak and they eventually could not stand to live in
the Islamic State.
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As they began to see how they were being used and manipulated as police women
and forced into being the wives for martyrs, Asma, Dua, and Aws eventually left Raqqa
for Turkey. The experiences of these young women show how native Syrian women
attempt to navigate the invasion of Islamic State forces by inserting themselves with the
power structures of the Islamic State. Participating in the Islamic State was about
attempting to survive and to reclaim the life that they knew—where they had the power
to make decisions even if it was over the punishment of others. To an extent, the
women’s participation within the Brigade was about reclaiming and asserting their
dignity as Syrians while their town became overrun by foreigners who all claimed to
want to liberate them, but proved only to oppress. In a poignant state, Asma says, “Who
knows when the fighting will stop? Syria will become like Palestine; every year, people
think: ‘Next year, it will end. We will be free.’ And decades pass. Syria is a jungle
now.”164
Conclusion

In looking at the diverse experiences of women in the Islamic State and
Palestinian, we see the many ways that these women have created spaces for themselves
to participate in and/or support armed struggle while also navigating “preexisting cultural
context of gender hierarchy, local conditions, and international and regional
developments”.165 The pursuit of martyrdom is not something restricted by gender, but
instead should be seen as a particular form of resistance that becomes more attractive and
significant within contexts of overt oppression and silencing of peoples. Women, like
men, have political motives for their actions, but also deal with additional societal ideals
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that often seek to restrict or compartmentalize their actions.
Contrary to many assertions made by Western feminists, the Palestinian examples
explored above have shown that Palestinian women’s participation in armed struggle is
an individual choice informed by many aspects of their lived experiences including a
desire to contribute to the larger nationalist movement. These women understand a key point
that many forget—the bodies of Palestinian women are politicized. Without understanding
the history and context of the occupation it is easy to overlook this fact, but the politicization
of their bodies is something that Palestinian women do not have the privilege of forgetting.
Why should their bodies, an area already politicized not be allowed to become their weapon?
Do their actions lose legitimacy simply because they are non-state actors, women, or a
combination of both?
As the Islamic State continues to grow and mature as a resistance and state-building
movement of sorts, it is important to remain cognizant of the developments of women’s
participation in armed struggle in Palestine, but also realize that the two cases, although
located in the same region are not the same. As we have seen, this transnational organization
has the support of many people in its territories, but it also seen as an authoritative and
violent group that has manipulated and taken advantage of many of those who are dealing
with civil unrest in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. In comparing the experiences of
muhajirahs, female migrants, and the natives who eventually joined the Islamic Sate it
becomes clear that one woman’s liberation is another’s oppression. We cannot not allow the
existence of women’s groups such as the al-Khanssaa brigade to represent Islamic
feminism(s), as any empowerment of migrant women stems from the oppression of natives
within the territory of the Islamic State.
While it is important to allow women to describe their own experiences and
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responses to the conflict that characterizes their lives, it is of equal importance to study the
ideologies and actors who seek to construct their own counter-narratives of womanhood. In
the next chapter I move away from women’s testimonies to focus on the powerful gender
constructs that they navigate.

Koranteng 62
Chapter Two
Mother, Daughter, Wife, or a Martyr: Narratives of Womanhood
The Palestinian woman is the first teacher... She is the carrier of the idea
of Palestine in this land.... She has the great and rare humane role as
"guardian of our generations" in revolutions and intifadas as well as in horizons of
peace.... The Palestinian woman has constructed institutions...
building Palestinian society in its lively, social, legal, economic, cultural, and
human aspects.... We cannot forget woman's role in our land in education,
and the shaping of the Palestinian human's memory from the moment he
comes into life..... Woman is the inspiration of artists in all of the human
ages.... The Palestinian woman is kneaded from the dough of this homeland's earth,
fragrant with its orange and lemon flowers, worked with its
Za'tar and olives.... She is a homeland named Palestine, the stem of our first
birth.
Excerpt from an article in a woman's journal published by the Jerusalem
Center for Women's Studies, titled "My Homeland in a Woman"
(Kul un-Nisa, Apr. 1996)166
Various actors within resistance movements in the Middle East construct their
own narratives of womanhood—placing women into the gender roles that they see fit. As
Cynthia Cockburn explains in her studies on gender and war, there is a difference in how
men and women are positioned within conflict, which can plausibly be extended to
extend such analysis to resistance movements. 167 Whether mothers, daughters, wives, or
even martyrs, these women’s purposes are often interpreted and manipulated in
combination with gendered lenses and ideological leanings. In this chapter I describe how
nationalist and Islamist ideologies have impacted resistance groups’ imaginings of
womanhood within their particular contexts. Most importantly, I elaborate on what is the
purpose of confining women to these roles and what exactly do they entail. In this chapter
I undertake here a contextualized study of women’s roles within resistance movements
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and state building projects in Palestine and The Islamic State as defined by different
groups and their connection to society, conflict, and their respective movement
ideologies.
Ann McClintock argues, “All nationalisms are gendered and all are invented… all
nations depend on powerful constructions of gender”. 168 Gender is key to understanding
these imagined communities as “systems of of cultural representation whereby people
come to imagine a shared experience of identification with an extended community”.169
In most male-derived definitions of nationalism, “Women are typically construed as the
symbolic bearers of the nation, but are denied any direct relation to national agency”.170 I
also focus on gender issues surrounding nationalism as they are generally “most sharply
articulated during periods of military conflict, when men’s and women’s bodies become
the site of that conflict”, which can be seen within both Palestine and the Islamic State.171
In the following sections I will focus on the four major ways that women are implicated
in the building of imagined communities as enumerated by Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya
Anthias that include;
•
•
•
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•

As active Participants in national struggles172

Nationalism & Palestinian Women

In the case of Palestine, in their attempts to mobilize large amounts of people,
“the Palestinian national movement were forced to deal with an important paradox: how
to define and conceptualize women’s roles without disturbing the delicate gendered
balance in Palestinian society”, in response they carefully constructed images of
Palestinian womanhood.173 After the formal creation of the state of Israel and
proliferation of Palestinian nationalist groups, Palestinian leadership drew on societal
norms including patriarchy in their construction of women’s roles which often
“reaffirm[ed] the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine conduct” and “pressur[ed]
women to articulate their gender interest within the terms set by traditional nationalist
discourse.”174 Palestinian womanhood became a signifier of “national honor”, with
imaginings of motherhood being key to their nationalist project.175
Motherhood

Within areas of conflict including many places in the Middle East, these contexts
of instability and violence have complicated mainstream notions of motherhood. In this
section I look at the ways in which mothering and motherhood have been defined,
experienced, and in some cases renegotiated within contexts of violence and nationalist
and resistance movements.
In Julie Peteet’s ethnographical text, Icons and Militants: Mothering in the
Danger Zone, she states that the “Key to understanding motherhood within Palestine is
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understanding the historical connection between masculinity and war”.176 For a long
time, manhood in Palestine was not directly associated with “war-making activities”,
particularly when Palestine was under Ottoman rule. Instead, a man’s honor was derived
from his ability to evade conscription. As political situations have changed, Palestinian
masculinity has now come to be rooted in the ability to protect, defend, and sustain home
and family through militancy or social astuteness.177 In contemporary Palestinian
formulations of gender, becoming a mother is the fulfilment of womanhood and the
attainment of femininity.178 Peteet argues that Palestinian women have reconstructed
narratives of motherhood and “responded to this conflation of mothering with
nationalism and act[ing] within its parameter while asserting their own demands and
claims on, as well as critiques of, the polity.”179
Motherhood at its most fundamental definition is based on a woman’s ability to
birth and take care of her children. Within the Palestinian context, the biological aspect of
motherhood is often conceptualized as a national duty to bear many children (Massad
1995; Peteet 1991: 184; Sharoni 1995: 35) in order to replenish wartime losses, which
categorize fertility and reproduction, cultivating a sense of contribution and commitment
to the national struggle.”180 This is no surprise, especially “when one considers… the
central role the myth (or reality) of ‘common origin’ plays in the construction of most
ethnic and national collectivities” and that “one joins the collectivity usually by being
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born into it”.181 The ability to give life prized within Palestine and the Islamic State as
one see Palestinian women speaking of holding “batin askari” (military womb) and
women of the Islamic State being praised as birthing the so called “cubs of the
caliphate”.182
In her study on the behavior and politics of reproduction in the city of Galilee
entitled, Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel, anthropologist
Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh explains how, “Reproductive practices and discourses have
become an important marker of self and other because they are a central framework in
Israeli definitions of self and Palestinian other.”183 Her study connects the Israeli
government and Palestinian nationalist leadership’s game of “political arithmetic” to
biological reproductive methods being used to sustain the state.184 Pro-natalist policies
were officially implemented by the Israeli government beginning in 1949, in order to
encourage the Jewish birth rate and achieve Zionists’ goals of creating a
“demographically homogeneous" Israel.185 In response to this “threat”, Palestinian
leadership began to emphasize the role of women’s bodies within the nationalist project.
Women were now “considered markers of national boundaries, not only symbolically but
physically as well.” Even much later in communiques of the Unified National Leadership
of the Uprising addressed to Palestinian women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during
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the first intifada, Palestinian women were primarily addressed by their reproductive
capacities or as mothers of prisoners and martyrs,.186 These reproductive activities
continue to be a form of nationalism and resistance in Palestine and increasingly in the
Islamic State.
Within nationalist discourse in Palestine, it is important that Palestinian women
produce “not just babies but Palestinian babies.”[sic]187 This duty is based on “an
imagined biological/genetic foundation—a conflation of birth and genetics with
nationality.”188 It is within this ideological framework that biological Palestinian
paternity becomes essential to the nationalist movement and a Palestinian woman’s
marriage to a man of a different nationality a viable threat. Women’s relationships
become fictional markers of the national collective.189
Peteet’s ethnographical research indicates that there are various forms of
mothering in Palestine, including “other-mothering” or “activist-mothering” have become
forms of political resistance through which these women support their communities while
under the attack of oppositional forces.190 Through “Other mothering”, women moved
past the nurturing aspect of motherhood into the realm of survival. This is particularly
significant as the ongoing occupation and wars that have resulted in the Israeli occupation
of Palestine have directly contributed to this form of mothering. In her interviews, Peteet
found that mothers even framed housework as a task of struggle (nidal)—“ to survive
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and maintain the family in crises referenced national participation”.191 Within “activist
mothering” women can keep their more nurturing duties while also engaging in political
participation and activism. As women embrace and renegotiate gendered roles within
their society they create more ways to relate to the nationalist agenda.
Similar to the case in Palestine, women in the Islamic State have seen many roles
emerge for women, but as detailed in a Manifesto and case study by the all-female alKhanssaa brigade “the purpose of her existence is the Divine duty of motherhood”.192 As
the biological producers for the caliphate, women who, “enjoy the rule of God in the
shadow of the Caliphate” and are exhorted to
fear God and fulfil your duties to the state, be careful not to do any harm
to it, knowingly or unknowingly. Bring up the sons of the Caliphate to
know true Tawheed. Bring up its daughters such that they know chastity
and decency. Know that you are the hope of the Umma. The guardians of
the faith and protectors of the land will emerge from you.193
Women do not fight for the Islamic State, instead performing instead a range of
domestic duties once they have settled in controlled regions. Ideals of femininity and
womanhood within IS are all steeped in the most conservative and literal interpretations
of Islam, which it believes will ensure that “everyone fulfil their Rightly ordained
roles.”194 As a whole, Muslim women are told that “woman was created to populate the
Earth just as man was” and that “her creator ruled that there was no responsibility greater
for her than that of being a wife to her husband.”195 The author further dictate the role of
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women saying, “Verily God has ordained this sedentary existence for women, and it
cannot be better in any way, for He is the Creator and He Knows what works and what
does not in religion” and quoting the Qur’anic verse “And stay in your houses” (Quran
33:33) to legitimate this view through appeal to scripture. 196 In its efforts to return to the
“purity” of the Islamic community at the birth of Islam, IS uses its defined gender roles in
the formation of its resistance movement and creation of its state.
Unlike the case of Palestinian women, as the Islamic State is a far newer political
entity, women within IS do not yet have the ability to renegotiate these constructed
narratives of womanhood, but I predict that as political situations change and the division
between the private home and the frontline are further blurred, these narratives will also
change. On January 27, 2002, Yasir Arafat he summoned a crowd of reportedly more
than a thousand women who he called his ‘Army of Roses’ and invited them to join the
armed resistance against Israeli occupation in an attempt to increase support from the
Palestinian people.197 He encouraged these roses to “shahida all the way to Jerusalem”,
his use of the feminine term for martyrdom allowing for a change in gender roles,
challenging societal imaginings of womanhood.198 When IS finds itself in a position
where it too needs more physical support as well as media attention, it may too move to
permitting women to participate in more militant roles—thereby instigating a
democratization of violence.
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Martyrdom and Militancy

Since the first Intifada, Palestinian women have gained more visible roles in the
Palestinian national struggle through demonstrating, sending sons out for jihad, and
participating in jihad themselves. In Brides of Palestine/Angels of Death: Media, Gender,
and Performance in the Case of the Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers, Dorit Naaman
posits, “When women opt to fight alongside men, they challenge the dichotomy of
woman as victim/man as defender. They challenge not only the images of women as
victims of war but also the traditional patriarchal binary opposition that postulates women
as physically and emotionally weak and incapable of determining and defending the
course of their own lives.”199 In taking up the role of militant, these women exercise their
political agency—reacting to the abnormal and unjust reality of their lives under
occupation through means that simultaneously strikes fear into their occupiers while
drawing observers attention to their plight.
Upon the completion of their operations, many of these women become icons of
Palestinian resistance. One of the first and most famous examples of this is Leila Khaled,
who is famous for first assisting in two hijackings in 1969 and 1970. A photo taken of her
with AK-47 in hand and a black and white Palestinian kuffiyeh covering her head,
quickly became the icon for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
Khaled was not only a mother in her own right, but also a “political warrior”—creating
her own definition of a Palestinian woman rooted in a deep love for her homeland and an
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opposition to the Israeli occupation.200 Her likeness can still be found in many different
mediums whether in the form of pop art, street art, and photography.201

Figure 11 Leila Khaled on the Separation Wall

The Palestinian reality—filled with violence, injustice, and steadfastness
continues to reclaim space for the re-envisioning and imaging of gender difference
beyond the symbolic status women as icons of the nation. After Leila Khaled and her
partner Dalal el Moughrabi so prominently opened the door to more militant roles for
Palestinian women, many others pushed beyond her and took up martyrdom operations.
The martyrdom mission of Wafa Idris, on behalf of al-Aqsa Brigade in January of 2002,
represented a turn in women’s jihad. Following her attack, Hamas leaders said that Jihad
was an obligation also for women because Islam does not differentiate between women
and men on the battlefield.202 This is especially significant, for as an Islamist organization
and one of the ideological frameworks used within the Palestinian nationalist movement,
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Hamas’ acceptance of female martyrdom shows that gender roles in Palestine are not
stagnant, but indeed open to redefining.
Hamas and the Role of Women

Hamas was formed on December 9th 1987, during the first intifada by the Muslim

Brothers. The new group called themselves the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas
and quickly became a contending resistance movement separate from and outside the
Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah. 203 Hamas describes itself as being
committed to implementing “the true Islamic principles and teachings with regards to
women, completely independent of certain cultural norms and societal backwardness.”204
In her text, “Islamist Women of Hamas: Between Feminism and Nationalism”, Islah Jad
contends that “Islamists, like nationalists, seek to establish an ideal society that depends
upon a particular conception of the ideal woman” and for much of its history Hamas has
not been an exception.205 She goes on to argue that, “the formal ideology of Palestinian
Islamists largely stems not from religious texts but from accommodation to contending
positions. The ‘traditions’ that the Islamist, like the modernist nationalist, seeks to revive
are ‘invented’ [sic] and, like those of the nationalist, are modern constructs (Hobsbawm
1983: 2–3).”206
Over time Hamas’ gender ideology has fluctuated and changed. As part of its goal
to end the Israeli occupation, Hamas’ website currently states that it “attempts to engage
the whole population, regardless of gender or age, in the liberation movement is a
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necessity” citing a Qur’anic verse which says, "The Believers, men and women, are
protectors of one another; they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil."207 For some
time militant roles within Hamas were reserved for men, and even when women were
allowed to move beyond traditional gender roles “the female martyr is constructed as
embracing culturally accepted gender norms at the same time that she steps outside of
them—she is modest, chaste, and a purveyor of family honor in her personal life, whereas
she is fierce, courageous, and the equal of men in the name of the cause.208 In 2002,
Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi described attacks led by female combatants as the
most important “strategic weapon” of the Palestinian resistance and said that, “There is
no reason that the perpetration of suicide attacks should be monopolized by men”.209 In
this vein, Female militancy becomes just another embodiment of the sacred, justifying
this new role in the eyes of Islamists such as Hamas. Based on the organization’s current
understandings of gender roles, females can serve in the Consultative Council, which is
responsible for the outline of the overall strategy of the Hamas movement and the
decision-making body as well as the Political Bureau, Cultural Bureau, and an additional
committee specialized in women’s affairs within the movement.
As we see in the case of Palestine, when traditional gender roles are challenged in
resistance groups, it is in the service of militancy or jihad.210 Jihad in the sense of violent
military action within the Islamic State is only is given to women by appointment and
only “if the enemy is attacking her country and the men are not enough to protect it and
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the imams give a fatwa for it.”211 IS has gone further to say that women's ultimate jihad is
migration to the Dawlah where they will live and fulfil their role of “support[ing], that is
be[ing] the base of men, Marrying well, that is marrying a fighter” and will later “accord
status and respect to women [who have] demonstrate[d] their commitment to the cause.212
IS continually reinforces its gender roles, even gendering jihad so that women may give
back to the state in a means that still aligns within what they define as women’s “true
nature”. Despite the creation of a “softer” jihad , there are many women within the
Islamic state who have shown interest in fulfilling a more active and armed role in IS’
resistance movement and citing the story of Nusaybah bint Ka’ab, may seek to change
this in the future.213
The al-Khanssaa Brigade has provided some women within IS to fulfil a more
physical role that allows them to enter the public sphere. The brigade is made up of
around 25 to 30 Middle Eastern women and is tasked with patrolling the streets of Raqqa
and Mosul to ensure that women observe the clothing rules for women as outlined by the
Islamic State and Sharia law.214 These women reportedly undergo a month-long training
and are allowed to carry guns. Middle Eastern women are chosen for the Brigade because
IS officials believe that Arab women are especially knowledgeable on topics of Shari’a
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since they have usually been raised within Islamic societies. In an interview with CNN, a
former member of the brigade spoke of punishing women who broke the law and then
men who permitted them to do so with lashing and in some cases biting.215
The Islamic State’s Hierarchy

The Islamic State (IS) as a movement is unique in the sense that it attracts women
from all over the world. As such a global movement, women from all over the world have
the opportunity to play both biological and non-biological roles within the state.216 This
past summer, one of the most influential women within IS was arrested. Umm Sayyaf,
wife of IS’s head financier Abu Sayyaf, was arrested by U.S. military personnel during a
raid targeting her husband. Her arrest not only provided the U.S. with important intel on
the inner workings of the Islamic State, but also launched Umm Sayyaf into the limelight.
Umm Sayyaf became the paragon for the elite class of women within the IS. During
interrogation sessions, she discussed her role in IS in relation with her husband’s status.
Umm Sayyaf claimed to help run IS’s networks of female operatives as well as “playing
enforcer for the men’s sex slaves”.217 Based on intel from Umm Sayyaf, it was found that
IS’ institutional structure is based on a hierarchy of power and information.
On its lowest rungs, women within IS’ power hierarchy are tasked with serving
the sexual needs of IS’s male members218 and are expected to fulfil their roles as mothers
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of the next generation of lions. On the next rung, we find the women of al-Khanssaa
Brigade who serve as a force to police women within IS, ensuring that women dress
modestly at all times. On the highest rung are the female professionals who help staff the
hospitals and schools of IS, and are permitted to leave the domestic space due to their
high level of education.219 Almost on the same level as these professional women are the
IS recruiters. Recruitment is very important in guaranteeing the growth of the Dawlah
and women are integral to not only the process of online recruitment, but also the creation
of propaganda for IS.220 These media-savvy women create accounts on Tumblr,
Instagram, Kik, Twitter, and other social media networking platforms in order to spread
IS’ message and guide other women to IS territory.221 Although the propaganda they send
out is about the idea of alienation and belonging, the carefully crafted rhetoric used in
recruiting other females is based in sisterhood and finding best friends, or spiritual
fulfilment.222 It is in these ways that women within the Islamic State merge their religious
duty and responsibility towards the caliphate to engage in resistance.
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Conclusion

As we have seen in the analysis of gender roles within resistance movements in
Palestine and the Islamic State, both Islamists and nationalists “seek to establish an ideal
society that depends upon a particular conception of the ideal woman.”223 In my research
I have found an overwhelming trend among many American, Israeli, and European
academics and opinion makers who use the idea of Arab society and the religion of
Islam’s “oppressive” gender roles to discount the various roles that women play within
conflict, war, and resistance within the Middle East.224 What these ‘experts’ fail to
understand is that “women are social beings dynamically interacting with their social
environments responding to multiple discourses and reflecting on diverse individual
experiences” and that “each gender’s experience must be contextualized and located in a
specific time and space”.225
When exploring women’s roles in more militant political engagement we must
keep an open mind. Women do not pursue these roles merely to “achieve high status”
within their communities, but because they believe that they have the power and ability to
do something—to take an action in order to help their community reach its ultimate
goals. Both women and men, movement leaders and individuals, can use the ideology of
gender to “cope with the consequences of chronic personal and familial security” as well
as exhaustive demands of the creation of a nation-state.226 It is not our job to approve or
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disapprove of the ways in which women navigate gendered spaces, but to remind
ourselves that concepts of masculinity and femininity are not fixed—following a
particular course of action does not make one more of a man or less of a woman. In the
next chapter, I will highlight the ways in which media have contributed to the creation of
the biased representations of female militancy in the Middle East that have come to
dominate mainstream conceptualizations of conflict in the region.
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Chapter Three:
Warriors, Widows, and Jihadi Brides: Media Representations and Framing of
Women in Conflict
“The bogus ‘war on women’ is so 2012
What’s hot now? The ‘war with women’”
-Monica Crowley

Figure 12 illustration on Islamized women joining the ISIS cause
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struggle or conflict, but what about the women? How does Western media portray the
women who choose to participate in acts of political and/or violent resistance within the
Israeli occupation of Palestine and the formation of the Islamic State?
Utilizing media framing theory, critiques of Orientalism, and gender analysis to
examine Western news stories portrayal of women engaged in resistance movements, I
argue that the media representations of these women are built upon orientalist and
gendered media frames that cause the general public to minimize and undermine their
participation and experiences within these conflicts. I focus on this issue within the
context of US and UK media representation because our media—newspapers, tweets,
podcasts, and blog—are where we as Americans often encounter and receive information
on current events in the Middle East. By critically studying this media, we see that just as
the nationalist and resistance movements often utilize gender myths to create support for
their causes, US and UK media sources communicate their own versions of these gender
myths in their reporting. Many of these constructed narratives of current events
misrepresent women in the Middle East in times of war and conflict and it is not until we
attempt to breakdown these constructs that we will be able to gain a more balanced and
holistic perspective on women in the machinery of war.
Women and the Reporting of War in the Middle East

Directly following the attacks on 9/11, images of Arab women were increasingly
used in US news media with women either wearing a hijab or burqah.228 In these cases,
we see how the media was selective in deciding how Muslim women are captured and
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presented within specific representation frameworks. For example, American politicians
use the trope of the oppressed Muslim women in attempts to gain support for intervention
within the region.229 These manipulations prevent us from appreciating the variety of
women’s lives across the Muslim or Middle Eastern worlds – differences of time and
place and differences of class and religious interpretation.230 This might then explain why
the US and UK’s are both disturbed and fascinated when presented with images of
Muslim women in the Middle East participating in resistance, more particularly
militarized or violent forms of resistance.
Although women are impacted in many ways during times of war and conflict, it
is not unexpected for their images and stories to be absent from the news, unless they
articulate the West’s preconceived notions of Arab women’s position and roles within
their societies and further justify Western oriental thought. This absence is unsurprising
as media theorist Herbert Gans points out, for “the news reflects the white male social
order” leaving no space for Arab women’s voice.231 Omissions of these women’s voices
not only impacts journalists’ work, but also affects the historical record, creating maledominated narratives of life during war.232 Western society's conceptions of war,
violence, and death are heavily biased according to gender stereotypes, which we see in
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news articles focusing on women who choose to participate in more violent or militaristic
forms of resistance.233
When we take a broad look at US and UK media’s reporting on female
combatants we quickly see that these women’s non-conformity is often what causes the
spotlight to fall on them. There are constantly attempts to fit these women into
conventional molds of femininity, which undermine their capacity as figures of
violence.234 Females combatants are often sexualized and their physical descriptions
comprise some of the first information featured in news stories reporting on them. As
Brigitte Nacos points out in her study of the portrayal of female combatants in media,
“When we cannot understand women in roles that cultural norms and prejudices perceive
as inherently male there is a tendency to resort to stereotypical explanations”.235
Moreover, network television and newspaper coverage of “terrorism” is overwhelmingly
episodic—focusing solely on who did what, where, and how, rather than exploring
overarching themes or contexts, which could possibly explain why certain individuals
choose to participate in “terrorist” acts. Armed resistance is a political act and often used
as a means for bringing about political change out of necessity, yet US and UK media
often fails to pause and question what these individuals’ goals are and what
circumstances push these actors to pursue more intense actions.236 In the rest of this
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chapter, I will conduct my own media analysis of media frames, including physical
appearance, the family connection, terrorism for the sake of love, the naïve and out of
touch terrorist, and the Islamic fundamentalist.237
The Physical Appearance Frame

Reporting based on physical appearance and feminine features is prevalent in
stories focusing on women, but are even more noticeable when analyzing stories focused
on female combatants and resisters within the Middle East. Their actions are constantly
juxtaposed by their physical beauty and emphasized as unnatural by focusing on their
feminine characteristics. Two of the earliest examples of media framing stories of Arab
female combatants in terms physical appearance are Leila Khaled and Wafa Idris.
Leila Khaled

Palestinian Leila Khaled skyrocketed into celebrity after becoming the first
woman to hijack an airplane in 1969, following up with another hijacking in 1970. An
activist and leader within the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—a
resistance movement formed in 1967 to struggle against the Israeli occupation of
Palestine—Khaled dedicated her life and hijackings to drawing the world’s attention to
the plight of Palestinians. 238 While her iconic photo clutching a gun has become a
symbol of rebellion, several decades after her original hijacking, media sources still use
this photo overly to emphasize her physical appearance to undermine her work in
liberation.
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Figure 13 Leila Khaled photographed in 1969

In Katharine Viner’s article on Leila Khaled she refers to the rebel as “the
international pin-up of armed struggle”. While she does make a reference to “female
power” she goes on to describe Khaled as having “fragile hands” with “shiny hair
wrapped in a keffiah” and “the delicate Audrey Hepburn face refusing to meet your
eye”.239 Her power is supposedly inspiring, but mostly because of the fact that she
conforms to US and UK media’s beauty standards. Tellingly, Viner claims that “the
reason behind her image's enduring power… [is] beauty mixed with violence”.240 Her
ability to represent feminine charms and a calculated militaristic resolve feeds into US
and UK media’s orientalist and gendered framework. She is perceived as their “token
terrorist”, the woman who oddly rebels against orientalist tropes of the oppressed and
voiceless Arab woman while remaining feminine.
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Wafa Idris

Wafa Idris was a 28- year old Palestinian woman divorcee living with her family
in a refugee camp when she participated in a suicide bombing attack in 2002. Detonating
a 22-pound bomb, she killed both herself and an 81-year-old man, injuring 100 others.241
In an article entitled, Twisted by anger, she turned to terror, run in a London newspaper,
Idris’ physical features were among the first pieces of information given about her
suicide bombing. She was described as, “an attractive, auburn-haired graduate who had a
loving family and liked to wear sleeveless dresses and make-up”, essentially a modern
and feminine woman.242

Figure 14 Wafa Idris, [Photo: AFP/Newscom] (left), Wafa Idris on Time magazine cover (right)
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In other articles, her status as a divorcee and inability to fulfil her wifely duties of
having children serve as frames to identify some of the supposed causes of the anger that
drove her to go on her martyrdom mission. It is her failure as a woman that is focused on
while the reality of her life—the numbers of wounded Palestinians that she was exposed
to on a daily basis through her job as a paramedic or the other realities of Israeli
occupation—is barely mentioned. Interestingly Wafa’s image was on the cover of a 2002
issue of Time magazine; yet the main article focused on male combatants who were
deemed unlikely suspects because they came from prosperous families or were not
religious.243 Here we see how an Arab woman’s photo becomes a stock image, used for
its shock factor, but her story remains untold.
The Family Connection Frame

The family connection frame seeks to portray female combatants in relation to
women’s “traditional” roles within the family. Articles and news stories focus on
motherhood and marital status, simultaneously undermining the political significance of
their actions and vilifying them for abandoning their familiar responsibilities. Women
such as Palestinian combatant Reem Riyashi and 3 sisters who along with their children
left the UK to join IS in Syria serve as two examples of women’s stories being framed as
rebelling against conventional narratives of womanhood.
Reem al-Riyadh

When news came out that on January 14th, 2004, that the 22-year-old Reem al-

Riyashi, the mother of two toddlers, had killed herself and 4 Israelis in a suicide
bombing, audiences were in shock. Catchy headlines called her a Bomb-ma and Terror
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Mom capturing the first signs of US and UK medias obsession with her motherhood.244 In
the New York Daily news article, BOMB-MA MADNESS: She Blows up and Kills 4
Israelis, the authors begin by saying of Reem, “A Palestinian woman with two toddlers
chose murder over motherhood”. 245 Throughout the article Reem is constantly chastised
for her desire to, “turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and to knock on
the doors of heaven with the skulls of Zionists” because of her status as a mother.246
Some attention is paid to the fact that she was Hamas’ first female martyr, but the article
quickly moves on to describing her family situation citing that, “and her husband got into
a fight with the rest of the family two months ago and she vanished after that”. Little time
is spent describing the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the subsequent struggles that
they face. She is instead portrayed as just a disgruntled wife who “blew herself and four
Israelis to smithereens”.247
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Figure 15 Reem Saleh Al-Riyashi with her daughter Duha (right) Al-Riyahi with her children, Getty Images 2004(left)

Soon after her death Hamas released photos that showed Reem al-Riyashi with
her children while dressed in military garb and holding a gun. In one case she is posed
with her small daughter who is holding what looks to be an explosive.248 Despite the fact
that US and UK Media often vilifies women like Reem, in her farewell video, she seems
to truly care for her children, saying, “God gave me two children and I loved them so
much. Only God knew how much I loved them”.249
The Naïve, Out of Touch, and in Love frame

In media reports and accounts that fall within this frame, women who choose to
participate in acts deemed as “terrorism” or are caught providing any type of support for
armed non-state actors are framed as naïve and out of touch with reality. Their actions are
not seen as resistance or a means to upset disproportionate power differentials, but
instead as merely baseless acts of revenge realized through terrorism —the weapon of the
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weak.250 Particularly in the case of Muslim women, we see large claims of women being
“brainwashed”, “manipulated”, and “tricked by their male counterparts. In some cases,
we even see that these women begin to support and become active in resistance
movements because of love and/or promises of marriage. This type of framing can be
seen in the reporting of Palestinian combatant Ayat al-Akhras’ attack as well as the recent
growth in articles detailing the lives and stories of the so-called “brides of ISIS”.
Ayat al-Akhras

On February 28th, 2002, Ayat al-Akhras became the third and youngest female

Palestinian martyr when she blew herself up in front of a West Jerusalem supermarket at
the age of 18.251 As the shock of such a young woman participating in a bombing attack
began to settle in, the media quickly jumped on the opportunity to “tell her story”—
providing readers with “insights” into who she supposedly was as a person and what
would drive her to such a violent and desperate act. Ayat’s story was of particular interest
to the media as one of her two Israeli victims was a 17-year-old young woman named
Rachel. News articles of Ayat’s martyrdom oscillate between blatant bias and a twisted
piece of chic-lit attempting to “explain” the female suicide bomber phenomenon.
In the ABC World News article entitled “At 18, bomber became martyr and
murderer”, and Newsweek Global article entitled, “A Jihad of her own” we are taken
through both Ayat and Rachel’s stories. While both articles touch on Ayat’s life living
within the conflict—seeing her brother and neighbors become victims of the Israeli
army’s violence, this aspect of her life is not emphasized. Ayat’s everyday reality was
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shaped by the Israeli occupation as she attempted to live a “normal” teenage life in
Bethlehem's Dehaisha camp, which is home to 10,000 Palestinian refugees.252 We
immediately see Ayat being portrayed as full of anger and resentment with one article
saying, “both young women were intent on their missions. One was searching for spices
and fish for a Sabbath dinner. The other was looking for an answer to her rage”.253
Throughout the ABC World News article Ayat is referred to as “outraged” and “angry” in
comparison to her “nonpolitical” Israeli counterpart.254

Figure 16 Ayat al-Akhras

In “A Jihad of her own” we see a mixture of familiar framing tropes. Ayat is
framed as yet another victim who fell prey to the “recruiting [of] the vulnerable and
disenfranchised [in]to terrorist organizations".255 At the same time there is an emphasis
on the fact that she was engaged to be married unlike her Israeli victim Rachel. Not only
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was she tricked into committing a violent act, but she is presented as another oppressed or
disadvantaged Muslim woman whose reality was “framed by future marriage and a more
traditional societal role”.256 The combination of Ayat’s young age, gender, and socioreligious context make not only her story an easy target for the press, but also catapulted
females participating in insurgencies and liberation fights within the Middle East into the
limelight.
The Brides of ISIS

Several media outlets have published sensationalized news headlines speaking of
“Brides of ISIS” and “jihadi brides” since the influx of women and foreign fighters in
order to join the Islamic State. These often overtly biased news sources focus on foreign
and Syrian women’s marriages to IS fighters as well exotic stories of ‘jihad al-nikah’ or
‘sex jihad’. As journalist Jalal Zein Eddine points out in his own article questioning the
concept of being ‘happily married to ISIS’, these types of articles attempt to overlook the
complexities of war and conflict. 257

Figure 17 Aqsa Mahmood [Tumblr/Enterprise]
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The tales of these women are spun into captivating narratives where we are
presented with stories of delusional women. In a September 2014 Guardian article
entitled “Schoolgirl Jihadis: The Female Islamists Leaving Home to Join Isis Fighters”,
we are told the stories of several young western girls who left the West to join the Islamic
state. We are supposedly given a look into their perspective.258 We are told about the
recent convert Karen and “how naive she had been” and the infamous three schoolgirls
from Bethnal Green who made headlines after sneaking into Syria via Turkey all without
their parents knowing.259 In other articles we see the story of Aqsa Mahmood—the
British Muslimah who was an “intelligent and popular teenager” who, like normal girls
her age, “loved to listen to Coldplay” but is now widely believed to be one of IS’ main
female recruiters.260 Aqsa seems to have been tricked into joining IS and becoming
radicalized, but does not speak very much on her life in Britain and what might have led a
teen who was living a “normal life” to leave her family and home to join the IS’s cause as
the bride of a Jihadi fighter and recruiter. While it is important that US and UK media
sources pay attention to women’s increased roles supporting and working within the
Islamic State, we must remain critical of their framing and analysis—remaining
conscious of the fact that there is a plurality of experiences within this conflict. Not every
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woman was tricked to move to Syria nor is every young female Palestinian combatant
dealing with uncontrollable teenage angst.
The Islamic Militant Fundamentalist Frame

As the religion of Islam and its followers have come under scrutiny within the
past few decades, it is no surprise that Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism are
overwhelmingly present in the US and UK media’s portray of female suicide bombers,
fighters, and sympathizers. Media that operates within this frame include articles that
overly analyze or emphasize religious praxis and contain images that play into the
Western imagination’s obsession with Islamic dress. The Islamic fundamentalism and
radicalization frame can be best understood by analyzing the US and UK’s media
coverage of Palestinian combatant Hiba Daraghmeh and articles on women in the Islamic
State.
Hiba Daraghmeh

On May 19th, 2003, 19-year-old Palestinian suicide bomber Hiba Daraghmeh

detonated her bomb outside a mall in the Israeli town of Afula, killing three people and
injuring many more. She was the first woman to carry out an attack for the group Islamic
Jihad.261 Her faith and more conservative interpretations of Islam quickly became
Western media’s focus after her attack. In the New York Times article entitled, “A Scholar
of English Who Clung to the Veil”, the article’s author begins to tell Hiba’s story by
pointing to her religiosity: “In 10th grade she began veiling herself… a religious devotion
that is rare” in her hometown of Tubas. It is also noted that “She was known as a member
of the ‘Islamic bloc’ of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, students said, and she helped the bloc
stage exhibits of political posters and cartoons, at which it sold cassettes of songs calling
261
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for jihad, emphasizing her openly Islamist and “radical” leanings.262 Portrayed thus, Hiba
is merely a fundamentalist Muslim, driven to her violent actions by her “Obsesse[sion]
with religious ideals.”263

Figure 18 Hiba Daraghmeh and woman wearing veil

In the case of Hiba, her veiling and modest dress would come to serve as a visual
symbol of her conservatism and pursuit of Islamic jihad. The imagery of a full face
covering—perceived as particularly foreign to western audiences, is invoked in the New
York Times as well as the Independent’s reporting of Hiba’s attack. In a sensationalized
retelling, Hiba is described as thus: “The white veil she also wore -- a badge of Islamic
fundamentalism – [which] concealed her head, mouth and nose”; “Only her almondcoloured eyes were visible to the outside world.” Her Islamic dress is not only used to
symbolize her extremism and further otherize her and women who choose to adhere to
this type of dress. We see this in the description of the Jellebab; “The Jellebab is the
flowing costume that envelopes the entire body. The white veil covering all but the eyes
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is a badge of fanatical Islam shunned by most Palestinian women including Hiba's
mother, sisters and female relatives”.264 This western obsession with Muslim women’s
clothing that surfaces in the reporting on Hiba’s attack further illustrates the West’s
unhealthy obsession and fascination with Islamic dress—boxing Muslim women into
roles they deem acceptable and creating a media circus when they happen to defy them.
Reporting on the Islamic State and Islamic fundamentalism

The Islamic fundamentalist frame must be understood differently within the
context of media analysis of the Islamic State due to the group’s ideological ties to a
more conservative and radicalized interpretation of Islam. Both women and men
subscribe to these ideologies. It is hard to ignore religion in any analysis of the Islamic
State as the group invokes Islam frequently to give legitimacy to the movement and its
operations.
In conclusion, through analyzing the many media frames found within the US and
UK media’s reporting on women’s roles and actions within the context of conflict within
the Middle East, we see an overwhelming trend of delegitimizing women’s
participation—especially when it is believed to be too violent. These portrayals and
defining in terms of outdated conceptions of femininity and cultural mythologies are a
form of violence in itself producing a “deadening effect… on our capacity to appreciate
the complexity and diversity of Muslim women’s lives—as human beings”.265 Indeed
these women are human beings who are operating within a challenging political,
economic, and societal context. They do not deserve to have their political actions and
acts of resistance quickly written off as delusional, a departure from the norms of
264
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womanhood, expressions of teenage angst, or as malicious acts of terror or baseless
revenge in the portrayals discussed above. This type of reporting inhibits US and UK
audiences from gaining a more in-depth and holistic view of conflict within the region,
while fulfilling these governments’ (especially the US) desire to be viewed as remaining
committed to their regional allies (Israel) while delegitimizing others’ actions (Palestinian
resistance). As we have seen women are not only in the machinery of, war they are a
mechanism of war. They are both manipulated and willing actors; they are both victims
and perpetrators. Women respond to their unique context—defying and redefining gender
roles along with them.
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Conclusion
It is commonly said that war is the great equalizer, which in a sense is true. Both
women and men are impacted by the insecurities of war and may seek to fight, but this
context of instability does not change the fact that patriarchy and other systems of
oppression are at play. We must remember, “Militant national liberation movements may
inspire women’s movements; they do not necessarily ensure equal rights and
opportunities, nor do they restructure asymmetrical gender relations” 266 and that;
Third World women have thrown themselves into national struggles with
an energy that derives ultimately from their social oppression, and in
doing so have often expressed their own critiques and aspirations.
National movements have formed both a liberating and constraining
framework for change in women's lives, as stages of state and economy
formation call them into new kinds of political action and labour.267
As the many examples from the two case studies used in this thesis show, Muslim
women’s participation in and/or support of armed struggle in the Middle East is much
more complicated and nuanced than US and UK media representations show. Just as the
significance of methodologies and tools of resistance fluctuate and change according to
context, so do Muslim women’s models of agency. Local, national, and transnational
actors/institutions, cultural norms, and history have been and will continue to be
instrumental in the shaping particular models of agency, allowing Muslim women to
meet specific individual and collective goals.268 These models of agency are as fluid and
dynamic as Muslim women’s identities within the region—products of meaningful
encounters.
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Interestingly, although on seemingly opposite sides of the conflict, constructions
of Muslim womanhood found in US and UK media representations and in the various
Islamist and nationalist ideologies steering their resistance movements mirror each other.
Their constructions of womanhood seek to mask Muslim women’s agency and ability to
navigate the cultural and political waters of their respective societies, instead burdening
women with their ideologically constructed responsibilities that are in reality highly
gendered. These constructs do little to take into account that our modern constructs of
femininity and masculinity have been created, but not cemented—as context and realities
change, so do the feminine and the masculine. This reductive method misguides the
public’s understanding of the complexity of the political situation in the Middle East and
how it impacts women. In addition, “to see women as such passive bystanders would be a
narrow view that ‘assumes that women's first interests reside in an unquestioned gender
identity and ignores... the links between women and their communities’" (Aretxaga 1997:
Io).269
So what are we to make of the continued rhetoric of women’s oppression within
the Middle East—of the evidence that shows how they are often instrumentalized and
manipulated by the movement leaders and ideologies that they encounter? We must first
think critically about why US and UK mass media sources might prefer to define
women’s experience by these types of factors. These types of narratives led to the mass
silencing of women’s experiences during times of conflict in the Middle East and North
Africa, allowing the US and UK to down play and defer their responsibility to the region
as international actors who have and continue to instigate conflict within the region while
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also framing any future intervention as a heroic mission to save the very people who they
victimize. Their method leaves little room for counter arguments and perpetuates the
continuation of orientalist conceptions of the people of the Middle East and fetishizing of
Arab woman. Second we must acknowledge and seek to understand how and women in
particular are often instrumentalized within these movements.
In conclusion, I would encourage academics and general audiences alike to
engage in more critical readings of all media. When we come across news reports of
female militancy within the Middle East, see images of Arab and Muslim women in
popular culture let us look beyond the mainstream messaging. Let us remember that
femininity’s association with peace is a myth rooted in “western historical glorification of
women as morally superior and the glorification of motherhood”.270 Just because some
people within our society still buy into these Victorian ideologies, does not mean that we
have to follow suit. As long as we absent mindedly consume these misrepresentations we
allow dominating powers to continue their campaigns of misinformation that thrive on
shrouding the Middle East, its people, and political situations in mystery. Most
importantly, instead of passively accepting dominant narratives of conflict within the
region, I implore us all to remember that in seeking out knowledge from diverse sources
can positively impact our understanding of the world around us. People are speaking,
women are speaking—it is our job to listen.
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